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"Useful knowledge, generally diffused 
through a community, are essential 
to the preservation of a free govern-
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Sam Houston. 
Cultivated mind is the guardian 
genius of democracy. It is 
the only dictator that freemen ac-
knowledge and the only security that 
freemen desire. 
President Mirabeau B. Lamar. 
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Building, Washington, D. C., for a list of pamphlets and prices. 
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1·he Extension Loan Librarian at the University of Texas 
has a number of ''package libraries'' containing the best ma-
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loaned in order of application. ]!~or this material write to Miss 
E. S. Goree, Extension Loan Librarian, University of Texas. 
In the references given below, the abbreviation '' Aff. '' signi-
fies that the article in question is on the affirmative side of the. 
subject, while the abbreviation "Neg." denotes a negativ.e ref-
erence. Some of the references al'e not thus designated because 
they were inaccessible for classification at the time this bulletin 
was issued. 
QUE'81'ION: Resolved, That for the next five years the 
United States should adopt a policy of increased military pre-
paredness. 
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BRIEFS OF BOTH SIDES 
By Samuel G. Baggett and Carl B. Callaway 
AFFIRMATIVE 
1. The position of the United States as one of the world powers 
necessitates an increase in military preparedness, for 
A. The probability of our being engaged in war is greater 
than in times past, for 
1. We are committed to definite policies which we 
are bound to maintain: 
a. The Monroe Doctrine. 
b. Open Door in China. 
c. Status quo in the Pacific. 
d. Neutrality of Panama. 
2. It is probable that we shall yet have to intervene 
in Mexico, for 
a. The Mexicans have repeatedly invaded om· 
territory and disregarded our rights of life an<l 
property. 
b. A virtual state of war has already existed on 
our border. 
c. "Intervention will prove the sole alternative 
to an indefinite state of anarchy." (Sidney 
Brooks, 19th Century 75 :1194. ,Tune, 1914.) 
B. We are no longer protected by isolation, for 
1. Our territory is now scattered from Alaska to the 
Panama Canal, and from the Caribbean Sea to the 
Philippines. 
2. Modern inventions have overcome distance. 
IL Our past experience warrants a change in our military 
policy, for 
A. Although we have been finally successful in our for-
eign wars, we have suffered unnecessary cost in 
1. Time. 
2. Lives. 
3. Money. 
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B. The conditions which guaranteed success in the past 
no longer exist, for 
1. Inexperienced men no longer make good soldiers, 
for 
a. The crown of victory rests with the trained 
army, for 
(1) The machinery of war is more compli-
cated. 
b. This is demonstrated by the European war. 
2. Our territorial isolation is a thing of the past. 
III. In case of war, the United States would be unprepared, for 
A. Our standing army is inadequate, for 
1. It is smaller than that of Russia, Germany, 
France, England, Austria, Italy, Japan or Mexico. 
2. We lack an adequate mobile force, for 
a. Too few men are left after provision is made 
for guarding our outlying possessions. 
3. Adding untrained men to fill vacancies would de-
stroy the efficiency of our army. 
4. The militia cannot take the place of the stand-
ing army, for 
a. Armies must be trained as units. ''Trained 
armies can alone meet trained armies. "-H. L. 
Stinson, Harpers Weekly, 56 :12. 
B. Our navy is inadquate, for 
l. It is insufficient to protect our coast, for 
a. Our coast line is 21,000 miles long, greater 
than that of any other nation. 
2. l\lany of our ships are antiquated, for 
a. The European war has revolutionized marine 
warfare. 
3. What ships we have are insufficiently manned, for 
a. Admiral Blue stated that we were short 18,-
000 men for the ships we had in 1915. 
C. Our coast defenses are not sufficient to defend our 
land, for 
1. They could not resist an attack from European 
warships, for 
16 Bulletin of the University of Texas 
a. Our guns have not the range of the guns on 
the modern warships. 
2. Our coast forts are inadequately manned, for 
a. The Secretary of War said we needed from 
8,000 ti) 10,000 more me·n to man the forts ex-
isting in 1915. 
IV. Greater military preparedness would be advantageous in 
times of peace, for 
A. It would be advantageous for police purposes, for 
1. More men are needed on the bor'der, for 
a. Our territory has been invaded in spite of 
the border patrol. 
b. President Wilson said during the recent 
Mexican trouble that he did not have enough 
men to properly protect the border. 
2. More police forces are needed in the Philippines. 
3. In times of a nation-wide strike or other internal 
disorder, our present force would be inadequate to 
handle the situation. 
B. The army could better carry on such constructive 
work as 
1. Building of Panama Canal. 
2. Building roads into Alaska. 
3. Sanitation of the Canal Zone and testing of anti.-
typhoid vaccine. 
V. With greater military preparedness, we could be of more 
service among the nations of the world, for 
A. We could better champion the cause of right, for 
1. Our voice would be stronger in the councils of 
nations, for 
a. A nation's influence is generally measured 
by its mHitary strength, for 
(1) The most influential nations of today 
are those which have the strongest arma-
ments. 
2. Right can only triumph over wrong when those 
who back right are stronger than those who up-
hold the wrong. 
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3. Our diplomacy would be strengthened, for 
( 1) ''The stronger the arm, the firmer the 
band that writes our diplomacy." 
B. We could aid more in bringing about international 
peace, for 
1. A strong nation could better propose disarma-
ment than a weak nation, for 
a. ''The concessions of the weak are the con-
cessions of fear. 
NEGATIVE 
I. The United States should not now depart from her estab-
lished military policy, for 
A. A limited armament has proved adequate in the past, 
for 
1. We have always maintained the smallest arma-
ment consistent with safety, yet 
2. We have been successful in all our foreign wars 
with a total loss of only 15,000 men, and 
3. We have been the aggressors in all of our wars. 
B. There is no increased danger warranting a sudden 
departure from this past policy, for 
1. There is no added danger from Europe, for 
a. The European nations cannot attack us for 
years to come, for 
( 1) The war has drained them of men and 
money. 
2. There is nothing to fear from Asia, for 
a. Japan, the only strong power capable of 
waging war with us, has repeatedly professed 
her co-operation with U. S. 
b. Our armament is far superior to that o.f 
Japan. 
3. Mexico does not present any new danger, for 
a. We are adequately prepared to handle Mex-
ico, for 
(1) We completely defeated Mexico in 
1848, and 
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(2) We are better prepared than ever be-
fore, while Mexico is in the worst condi-
tion of her history. 
II. Our military preparedness is sufficient to guarantee our 
..safety, for 
A. Our navy is adequate, for 
1. It is second in size and efficiency only to that of 
Great Britain. 
2. Naval experts agree that it is sufficient to resist 
the attack of any nation in the world, for 
a. Foreign navies would have to operate away 
from base. 
B. Our coast defenses are adequate, for 
1. General Weaver, Cl1ief of Const Defense, sayR 
they are the best in the world. 
2. Aided by the navy and our mines, they could 
prevent the landing of any nation, for 
a. The inability of a navy to cope with coast 
defenses has been demonstrated by the Euro-
pean war. 
C. Our third line of defense is ample, for 
1. We have nearly four million trained American 
soldiers, 
a. Over 127,000 in the regular army; 175,000 
provided for by Act of Congress in 1916. 
b. 350,000 who have passed through the army 
in the last seventeen years. 
c. 150,000 in the militia, to be raised to 550,000 
by 1918. 
d. 33,000 in our military schools together witb 
40,000 who have graduated since 1905. 
e. 3,000,000 able-bodied Americans who have 
had military instruction in the U. S. or abroad. 
2. A large standing army is unnecessary in Amer-
ica, for 
a. Our navy and coast defenses eliminate the 
necessity for a large army. 
b. The success of the British troops in the 
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European war shows that a small army re-
inforced by recruits can successfully meet 
trained armies. 
D. Onr geographical position renders us safe from at-
tack. 
III. An increase in our armaments would add nothing to our 
relative strength, for 
A. It would simply rarse the level of armaments, for 
1. Other nations would make a corresponding in-
crease to offset ours, for 
a. England will keep up her two-to-one naval 
policy at all odds. 
(1) Lord Salisbury of England said publicly 
that if we increase our nayY, England 
will make a corresponding increase. 
2. Germany, Japan, and other nations will main-
tain their military policies. 
IV. Extreme preparedness encourages war, for 
A. If we have large armies and navies, we will be more 
apt to use them on slight provocation, for 
1. ''Every organ demands the exercise of its func-
tions." 
B. It causes a spirit of militarism, which in turn encour-
ages war. 
C. The nations of Europe were the best prepared na-
tions in the world. 
D. Prepare for peace and we get peace; prepare for war 
and we get war. 
V. Our chance to lead the world in bringing about international 
disarmament would be lost, for 
A. It would mean that we would enter the armament 
race with other nations. 
B. Not national competition, but international union 
for defense against future wars, is the mandate of both 
reason and experience. 
C. "He who comes into equity, must come with clean 
hands." 
SELECTED ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF INCREASED 
MILITARY PREPAREDNESS 
LESSONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
Edward Breck, M. A., Ph. D. 
A great man has said, ''The more history you know the wiser 
you are ! '' According to this standard the American people fall 
considerably short of wisdom, for the study of history has never 
been considered by Americans in any other light than as a means 
of indulgence in smug self-glorification. To this end the historic 
muse has been all but bereft of her garment of truth, and the 
American people, broadly speaking, is to this day, shamefully ig-
norant of the actual facts of its development. 
A burnt child fears the fire, but too often a burnt nation for-
gets almost over night t'liat there has been a fire. The possibilitie:s 
of future national conflagrations were never more explicitly 
pointed out than by Washington himself in the very earliest days 
of our history, and his wonderfully far-seeing advice on the sub-
ject of defense is as pertinent today as it was then. But, in spite 
of it, the army and navy were so neglected after his retirement 
that, from 1808 to 1812, the former consisted of less than 10,000 
officers and men, while the navy was as good as a non-existent, 
until the depredations of the Mediterranean pirates resulted in 
the building of a few fine frigates. These, with their splendid per-
sonnel, were all that we possessed, when there came to us in 1812 
one of those crises foretold by Washington, when the choice be-
tween disgrace and honor left us no decision but for war, "tt 
war,'' as President Wilson has rightly called it, ''of arms brought 
on by a program of peace.'' Stung to action at last by the out-
rageous impressment of our seamen, w~ declared hostilities 
against Great Britain, with a standing army of 6,744 officers ancl 
men, and a navy of seventeen vessels, mostly of little military 
value, carrying 450 guns. This force was to oppose the veteran 
armies of England and the greatest fleet the world had ever seen, 
ronsisting of a thousand vessels and 28,000 guns! 
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Had we possessed a reasonably powerful navy, including a 
squadron of ships-of-the-line, plus a really efficient army, there 
would, in all probability, have been no war, for the simple reason 
that England would not have dared to take the risks of a war 
with America merely for the sake of her orders in council and the 
blustering proof that an Englishmen once was an Englishman 
forever. What such a fleet and army would have cost us would 
l:ave been but a paltry sum compared with the actual costs of th<> 
war, direct and indirect. Furthermore, had we been properly 
prepared, heedful of the advice of Washington, and had England 
nevertheless dared the conflict, there is no military authority wh0 
does not know that she would have been soundly thrashed. Her 
great line of battle ships would not have been able with immunity 
to convey troops across the seas, and Canada would now be a part 
of the United States. 
But if you will take the trouble to inspect the American school 
and college histories used even at this day, you are very likely to 
get from them the impression that we actually thrashed Great 
Britain ! In them you will find nothing of the bill passed by 
Congress to raise thirteen new regiments for the avowed purpose 
of "conquering Canada," a purpose which we so lamely essayed 
to put in practice that at th< end of the war we were in possession 
of no part of Canada; in fact were glad enough to have prevented 
the British and Canadian troops from invading our own soil! 
In these so-called histories you will find nothing of the solemn 
fact that up till the signing of the treaty of peace, the only dl)-
cisive victory for the American arms on land was at the Thames, 
where the British were largely outnumbered. Our defeats are 
mentioned with indulgence, and many of them metamorphosed 
into victories; the disgrace of Detroit, where 1,800 Americans, 
mostly, to be sure, militia, surrendered without a blow to 720 
British and 600 Indians, being about the only frankly confessed 
disaster. These books gloss over the affair at Bladensburgh, 
where fewer than 1,500 British put to almost instant fli;i;ht ove" 
5,000 Americans, after which they gaily marched to Washington, 
burned down our capitol, and committed other villanies with con-
temptuous immunity, whereupon our Secretary of War fled to 
Baltimore and resigned ! 
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At Plattsburg two columns of Americans, some 13,000 in all, 
recoiled before 2,000 British. 
Do these books tell their readers that we outnumbered the 
enemy more than ten to one? l have never found this truth stathl 
in one of them. One recoils before the speculation upon the out-
come of the War of 1812, had England not had her hands full 
with the terrible fight against the Corsican usurper. 
The war between the States offers a large number of vitally im-
portant lessons to the present generation. The first is the decisive 
influence of sea power, and in this connection we must not forget 
that, in a somewhat less degree, we are in the same position as 
Great Britain, since any serious attack must come from across 
the water. This means that we stand and fall with our navy, even 
supposing that there were no such thing as the· Monroe Doctrine, 
the upholding of which our President has called ''a solemn 
pledge.'' Do Americans fully appreciate that this means that, in 
case South America should be attacked by one or more European 
or Asiatic nations, the American navy would have to fight 
hostile fleets, not only off our own coasts, but very possibly off 
the shores of the Argentine or Chile? 
The Monroe Doctrine was not seriously challenged until the 
Civil War found us with our hands full. But, before taking up 
the Mexican question of the early sixties, let us remind ourselves 
that it was naval power that finally brought the heroic South to 
her knees. It would be a bold historian who would assert that the 
South would have been beaten in four years, or in ten, or perhaps 
in any time, if she could have kept her ports open for the expor-
tation of cotton and the unlimited influx of supplies· and muni.-
tions of war. It was not until our navy became strong enough to 
1::lockade the ports of the South that economic and military star-
vation caused her political fall. 
Then it was that Uncle Sam first found himself in a position h) 
turn his gaze southwards to Mexico, where Napoleon was attempt-
ing. in fullest contempt of the Monroe Doctrine, to establish an 
empire under French influence with the unfortunate and duped 
Maximilian at its head. 
Let us recall the situation exactly, in view of the oft-repeated 
assertion by the advocates of disarmament, to the effect that after 
the present great war the belligerents will find themselves in such 
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a state 0£ exhaustion that danger from them will be unthinkable-
How was it in 1865 Y The United States had just finished a ter-
rible struggle of four years against the bravest and toughest of 
foes, and, according to the tenets of the Pacifists, she must have 
been so weakened as to be incapable of asserting herself against 
aggression. Was this the truth, in spite of the fact that aggres-
sion threatened from the two most powerful nations of the world f 
Let us see. 
Harldly had the war closed when Secretary Seward called upon 
the French government to withdraw its troops from Mexico, upon 
the frontiers of which our army was concentrated. In those days 
the French military prestige was what that of Prussia is today, 
and Louis Napoleon was the essence of pride and ambition. But 
did he hesitate to obey the mandate of the American government? 
Not a day! The Tricolor bowed before the Stars and Stripes, and 
Napoleon's army slunk off in the dark, leaving the miserable 
Maximilian to his £ate. 
The next step taken by our government was to demand 0£ 
Great Britain the payment 0£ damages for the depredations 
against our merchant marine by the Confederate privateers-. 
which were fitted out and launched in England with the conni-
vance of the British Government, to which it was made plain that 
war would be the result of a refusal to arbitrate. The worlJi 
knows the result. A Government bitte·rly hostile to the Govern-
ment of our country, and possessing the greatest navy in th~ 
world, recoiled before the idea of a war with the United States. 
And why in 1865 did the Union Jack and the Tricolor bow to 
the Stars and Stripes? Because, far from being weakened in a 
military sense by the four years of terrible war, she was at that 
time incomparably more mighty than she ever had been before! 
Without taking time to follow out this significant and instruc-
tive train of thought, it is sufficient to say that, after the present 
war, several nations will possess veteran armies such as the world 
never saw before, and some of them will have navies that wilJ 
possibly be nearly intact. Their financial weakness will not in-
terfere with a renew11l of hostilities, and perhaps may have thl' 
effect of a desire to reeoup at the expense of some very rich and 
very weak country. somewhere over seas! 
Though there were plentiful signs that the chronic Cuban qucs-
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tion would soon develop into war, nevertheless Congress did little 
to increase or strengthen either navy or army in the years im-
mediately pre<!eding 1898, no doubt reflecting the general op-
timism and carelessness of the whole country in regard to foreign 
complications. 
On March 9th, the Congress voted $50,000,000 for ' ' national 
defense," but nothing for offense, and not a cent was available 
even for offensive preparations. Many mines were laid, but our 
coast was practically defenseless to a first-class naval enemy. 
All our artillery pieces, field and heavy, were constructed for 
and actually used black powder, and while poor little Spain 
armed her troops with the best rifle in the world and gave them 
emokeless powder, our great rich country had just enough smoke-
less powder to supply our regulars and one regiment of volun-
teers, the Rough Riders. All other volunteers, among them 
the flower of our youth, were sent to the front and some of them 
actually into battle, with an obsolete gun and black powder! 
At the ·battle of Caney the Second Massachusetts, as good a 
volunteer body as we have ever had, had to be withdrawn from 
the firing line afte1~ <;:erious los"!es, because their old Springfields 
could inflict little or Il') dair.<:if!e to the enemy, while the smoke 
of their black powder served but to give the enemy the range. 
In the same manner the fire of our field guns served the enemy 
the same pm·pose. 
After two months of feverish preparation, this rich and prourl 
country succeeded in getting together 17,000 men of the Fifth 
Army Corps at Tampa, and the confusion and inefficiPncy th~t 
followed in the effort to embark could be justly compared only 
with the mise-en-scene of an opera bouffe. It is signific:mt of the 
state of mind of our people at that time, that, when one of our 
newspaper correspondents at Tampa, Mr. Poultney Bigelow, 
dared to tell the truth in his dispatches, his words were greeted 
with incredulity, with jeers, and in some quarters with the cry 
of ''Traitor!'' 
Since then every historian. including Colonel Roost>velt, has 
testified to the humiliating truth of these charges. 
At last the regiments, and really fine ones they werc>, so far 
as the personnel went, got afloat in transports hired for the pur-
pose and for the most part quite independent of naval or military 
authority. By the most exceptional luck, and with the aid of 
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the navy, the men were landed near Santiago, though they had 
no proper means of landing, and could not have done so if the 
weather had not been perfect, or if the Spanish army had made 
a determim;d effort to prevent the landing. If such a man as 
Weyler had commanded at Santiag.o the expedition of the Fifth 
Corps might have suffered disaster right there. 
Few, very few indeed, of our countrymen appreciate even to-
day the narrowness of the cleft that separated our soldiers in 
1898 from the disaster, nay, from probable annihilation. The 
supine lack of all initiative of the Spanish command6rs, some-
thing that could never be repeated, was all that saved us "Had 
there been on the Spanish side any generalship worthy the name, 
it is doubtful whether there would have been anything left of 
Shafter 's army," is the way in which Sargent puts it. The Span-
iards had plenty of time to concentrate a force of twenty or 
even twenty-five thousand men at Santiago, which could have 
taken up an unflankable position, forcing Shafter to a contin-
uous offensive against odds, and the fever would have done the 
rest. As it was, it is most probable that, if the Spaniard had 
placed on the heights of Santiago the men who were idly and 
unnecessary defending quite unattacked positions to the west 
of the city, these would have been enough to keep back the 
Americans for a week, until the dread fever touched them, and 
then T One shudders to think of the inevitable sequel. It would 
have been a special Providence if a man of the Fifth Corps 
ever looked again on the soil of his country! And even as it was, 
with Providence called upon as never before to make good our 
shortsightedness and inefficiency of Washington, the Surgeon-
General reported that there was not an American soldier who 
returned from Cuba without the germs of disease in him. 
In this miserable business, when the richest count1'y in the 
world sent its sons to slaughter in a manner that should arouse 
indignation to the pitch of frenzy, we lost some 350 men from 
bullets and over 1,350 by disease. 
These are some of the lessons of our history, and in the con-
templation of the practical efforts for real and immediate prt>-
paredness, which the gradual awakening of the American people 
are now making imperative, it is well to keep the past constantly 
in mind. 
Have we learned our lessons T 
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HOW BIG AN ARMY DO WE NEED? 
'I'HE MILITARY PROBLEM OF THE UNITED STATES 
By George Marvin 
By being unprepared for war the United States has not in the 
past avoided war. Whatever, therefore, may be the difference 
of opinion concerning the way we shall deal with our military 
problem, tha·.: problem exists. 
The military problem of the United States may be conven-
iently considered within the confines of the Nation itself. Here 
it has lawfully been used to suppress insurrection, to enforce the 
law when ordinary methods failed, to overcome obstructions of 
the Uni~d States mail, to enforce neutrality, to compel obedience 
to quarantine regulations, to run a telegraph line across Alaska 
(and soon to build the first government railroad in that region), 
to build the Panama Canal, to supervise the construction and 
repair of river an~ harbor works, to take charge of the situation 
when San Francisco was <fostroyed and when the Ohio River 
overflowed its banl\::;, to restore' oriler in great strikes in the 
mining regions, and to perform hundreds of other tasks that 
seem to be rather civil than military. As our population has 
grown anC: our territory extended it has been necessary to detail 
more men frorr1 th~ army for activities not directly military until 
now, though the greatest efforts are made to do so, it is impos-
sible to keep the requisite number of officers with their troops. 
Leaving .out of consideration the possibility of our having t.:> 
intervene in any neighboring republic, much less of engaging in 
a war with a first-class power, the army is inadequate to perform 
even its peaceful tasks. 
The second phase of our military problem is the potential 
necessity of having countries close to our borders. Intervention 
bas more than once been aC:knowledged a necllHsity. We have 
"intervened" in Cuba, in Santo Domingo, in Haiti, in Nicara-
gua, in Colombia. and in Mexico. We may conceivably have 
to intervene in any one or all of these countries agnin . The 
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size of the forces which would have to be sent dep::mds upon 
the strength of the detachments it would be necessary to oppose. 
The smallest of these possible hostile forces will seldum requir,; 
less than from 8,000 to 10,000 regular troops. To intervene in 
Mexico would require upward of 100,000 regular troops in au 
expeditionary force. 
There is no such number of regular United States troops avail-
able. To support them and to take their places would requir~ 
a much greater number of volunteer or improvised troopEi, which, 
also, are not available. Just to assemble such troops as the latter 
takes a very long time; it requires more time to supply them 
with proper military material, and still longer time to train 
them to be of any use in active campaigning. MeanwliUe, the 
prospective opponent is perfecting his defense. Comequently, 
the time taken to organize and put into the field these improvised 
troops costs more in lives and treasure than to have )llaintained 
a trained force. 
Suppose, again, that an insurrection broke out in the Philip-
pines: By sending all the mobile Regular Army left in the United 
States to augment that portion of it already in the islands, the 
rising could undoubtedly be put down, provided that the rebels 
received no outside assistance. If, also, while this army was ab-
sent, Mexico should attempt to invade Texas and New Mexico. 
the present number of organized militia could very probably beat 
back the attack. The Mexicans, however, would certainly cros~ 
the border and come a long distance this side of it before they 
could be stopped. In that interval they might cause great dam-
age. To take the offensive promptly and go deep into Mexico 
with this force of militia, military men consider absolutely out of 
the question. A long time would elapse before such improvised 
troops could be brought to a state of efficiency justifying such an 
~xpedition. 
NO ARMY TO MOBILIZE AGAINST INV A SI ON. 
Neither the necessity for the use of the army in a strictly in-
ternal way nor it<> use for comparatively small expeditons to for-
eign states is apt to threaten seriously the national entity or in-
dependence of the United States. But suppose we should be con-
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fronted by a hostile power of the first class? The first question 
that would arise would be the question of mobilization, and here 
we bring up against the disturbing truth that the United States 
has no scheme of mobilization in fact. We have got some plans on 
paper. The Regular Army of the United States cannot mobilize 
the equivalent of one European army corps under existing con-
ditions, for it is not organized on the basis of war duty; it is 
organized as a constabulary. 
The organized militia cannot mobilize any unit of trained men 
complete above the infantry brigade. Even such an infantry 
brigade cannot be termed "trained." The militia is com posed of 
military establishments in th.e various States ove·r which the Fed-
eral Government has a very limited jurisdiction. The individual 
States can have any sort or kind of troops they wish, or none at 
all. One State has none at all. The aggregate· paper strength of 
the mobile part of the organized militia amounts to about 106,000 
men, but of this number almost one-third failed during the last 
year to participate in the annual instruction camps, and only 
little more than one-half of the men armed with rifles had range 
practice with rifles. 
Under such conditions there can be no mobilization of United 
States forces, strictly speaking, for the very good reason that 
there is no war unit to mobilize. If the need should suddenly 
arise for an army we should have to improvise an army as we 
have improvised other armies in the past. To do this and to ren-
der the individuals composing such an army really efficient col·· 
lectively so that they could march and fight as divisions or army 
corps would require more than two years on the basis of a mobile 
army of 500,000 men fit for duty on the line of battle. 
All continental European countries can mobilize their active 
und reserve armies in about one week, with the exception of Rus-
sia, which requires about three times this period. After mobili-
zation is complete, about one-third of the active and reserve 
armies can be concentrated on the frontiers within one week. 
R-0ughly, 14 days after the declaration of war the great field 
armies are able to engage in the campaign, both mobilization and 
concentration having been carried on under the protection of 
troops always kept at or near war strength along the frontiers, 
which promptly on the outbreak of hostilities engage the corres-
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ponding troops with which the enemy is guarding a hostile 
frontier. 
In the face of these facts we have continued to trust the sea 
that surrounds us to defend us from attack. But the sea is no 
longer a complete bulwark against invasion. Sea distance is no~ 
now measured in miles but in days. The Pacific Ocean today is 
no wider than was the Atlantic a few decades ago. The Atlantic 
itself has shrunk to the size of a Great Lake. Hence, if a world 
power at war with the United States could gain command of the 
sea their line of communications for an attack on either the At-
lantic or Pacific coast would be no longer, in time, than was Gen-
eral Grant's in the Civil War when he was conducting his opera-
tions against General Lee's army in Virginia. Furthermore, 
larger amounts of materials and supplies could be transported in 
one of the great steamers of today than could be carried by all of 
General Grant's transportation-water, rail and wagon. On thii; 
basis, then, of time intervals we now find our once long distance 
friends our close neighbors. These neighbors are polite but firm 
and their military resources can be converted into military· 
strength in an incredibly short time. 
MILITARY RESOURCES AND STRENGTH. 
The average citizen of the United States has always been 
prone to confound military resources with military strength. 
One is entirely distinct from the other. Military resources 
consist of all the men of military age and all raw material, 
such as horses, motors, materials for clothing, leather for shoes, 
meat and corn for food, coal, iron, lead copper-in fact, all the 
products necessary for the creation and supply of an army. 
Military strength is the proper utilization of these resources so 
that they can be converted into efficient army units, sufficient 
in number for use at the necessary places at the critical time. 
To convert military resources into military strength in the 
present day requires a longer time than it ever has before in 
the world's history. It is generally accepted as a fact that any 
nation, no matter how strong in military resources it may be, 
if attacked by a nation even very much weaker in military 
resources, which has already converted these resources into 
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military strength, will have absolutely no chance to defend 
itself at first and a very slight chance for evential victory in 
that war. This conclusion simply for the reason that the nation 
strong in military strength can immediately place the proper 
number and kind of military forces at the critical point at the 
proper time. 
MAIN DEFENSE THE FIELD ARMY 
The Nation's main dependence in war, then, is its field or 
mobile army, which is that part of a nation's military estab-
lishment which can move from place to place, meet the enemy 
wherever he may be found, either at home or abroad, and 
which can fight either offensively or defensively, as occasion 
requires. The great m11itary problem that confronts the United 
States is to determine what its mobile army shall consist of, 
where it shall be stationed, how it shall be supplied, armed and 
manned with properly frained men, and lww it shall be admin-
istered. 
What should the size of this army be Y This is determined 
by the size of the armies that may be brought against us. It 
must be ready in time to stop a hostile invasion. Otherwise, the 
enemy, by seizing the great centers of population, railroads, 
and supplies, might paralyze the defense and render it impos-
sible to create improvised troops. Strange as it may seem to 
those who have not given the matter consideration, this is per-
fectly possible of accomplishment by several nations. The na-
tions mentioned below have a sufficient merchant marine to 
transport in one trip the numbers given across the Atlantic or 
Pacific Oceans. The manner in which these figures are arrived 
at is to take the total amount of sea-going tonnage possessed 
by the nation in question, figure on one-third of this being in 
home ports, one-third at sea, and one-third in foreign ports, 
which is the usual way of determining the distribution of ship-
ping at any one time. Should preparations be made for a move 
to the United States, as they certanily would be in case of war, 
probably one-third more tonnage could be recalled by wireless 
in one week, the period necessary for the mobilization of the 
foreign armies. Should more time than one week be taken for 
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gaining command of the sea, probably the whole or nearly all 
of a possible enemy 's ships could be placed in service for over-
sea expeditions. For European troops from two or three net 
tons of shipping are required per man; for Asiatic troops, about 
one-half of that weight. 
POSSIBLE INVADING ARMIES 
The amount of steam ocean-going shipping available for ex-
peditions of the various countries is approximately as follows : 
Tons 
England ·········-···········································································-····························· 11,145,160 
Germany ................................................................................................................... 2,655,496 
Germany had available 747 ocean-going steamships of 2,000 
tons or more, some of them the largest carrying ships of the 
world. A conservative estimate of the number of troops which 
the average ship of this class can carry is 1,500. In 1912, Ger-
man private shipyards turned out 927 vessels of a tonnage of 
480,038 (including twenty-three war vessels of 52,062 tons). 
Japan -···················- ····--····························-··················-··························-········-
France (223 ocean-going steamers) ............................................ .. 
Italy (129 ocean-going steamers of more than 2,000 
tons)·············-·······---··································-··········· .... ·-··-··········-·--·················· 
Austria --···- -- ·-··············-·······-····························-·-······-··- -···-··-
Sweden (331 ocean-going steamers of more than 
1,000 tons ···················································································-·········-·········· 
Norway (total ocean-going steam and motor) .... ·-····-······ 
Holland (367 oeean-going steamers) .... . ... . ... . 
Tons. 
1,430,329 
515,236 
369,000 
407,061 
636,125 
1,718,606 
576,679 
Speaking generally, the great nations of Europe can easily 
mobilize and embark their forces within one week after the 
declaration of, or intention of entering on, war; and from the 
time of leaving their home ports ten days may be considered as 
the time which will be required to cross the Atlantic Ocean. 
On the seventeenth day, therefore, the following forces could 
begin landing on this continent, provided sufficient command of 
the sea were obtained : 
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England ··············-··························································· 300,000 17th day 
Germany ·····-·······-······················-·············-···················· 200,000 or more 17th day 
On the Pacific Coast, counting one week for mobilization and 
twenty days for crossing the Pacific, the following number of 
Asiatic troops could begin landing: 
Japan ......................................................................................................... 200,000 27th day 
Should the above nations be in alliance with either Mexico or 
Canada, the following troops would be available: 
Canad-a ·············································································-···················· 40,000 10th day 
Mexico for offensive purposes ...................... ·-················· 60,000 10th day 
Total. ..................................................................................................... 800,000 
This number could be brought against the United States with 
the present means of transportation available on the 27th day, 
but would involve a combination of all the powers enumerated, 
which is highly improbable. From this approximation, how-
ever, it can be seen what numbers would be available from 
combinations that might be effected by these nations. England 
with Canada could bring to bear 340,000 by the 17th day ( 40,-
000 Canadians on the tenth day); Germany, 200,000 on the 
17th; if in alliance with Mexico, 60,000 in addition on the tenth 
day, or a total of 260,000 men; Japan, 200,000 on the 27th day; 
if in alliance with Mexico, 60,000 more. Any of the European 
nations able to command the sea have sufficient merchant 
marine, so that if political conditions at home were such as to 
enable them to detach troops from their country at will, they 
could within another month after their first landing bring 
their forces up to a million mim on this continent. The only 
exception is England, where, although plenty of transportation 
is at hand, there is no such number of soldiers available. But 
as England has strong alliances with other European nations, 
they could furnish the troops. 
Briefly stated, then, aside from the naval part of the problem, 
the solution which the United States must be ready to furnish 
is to meet successfully the following invading troops, either 
singly or together: 
.llilitary Preparedness 33 
100,000 men on 10th day (Canada and Mexico). 
200,000 to 300,000 European troops on the Atlantic Coast, 
17th day. 
200,000 Asiatic troops on the Pacific Coast, 27th day. 
500,000 men on the 27th day. 
As has been shown, this is more of an understatement of the 
carrying capacities of the ships of the various nations than the 
reverse. Forces of the ~ize mentioned, coming either from 
Europe or Asia, after they have once made a lodgment on 
American soil, can be rapidly reinforced until the million mark 
could probably be reached in from one to three months after the 
first landing in America. 
The efficiency of these forces individually and collectively 
will be very high, especially after the present wars are com-
pleted. Whatever the outcome of the present European conflict 
may be, the military relation of Europe with respect to the 
United States will be stronger instead of weaker; that is, more 
trained men, both for army and navy, will be available, more 
material and equipment, and a thorough knowledge of the 
proper manner in which they can be applied to gain the maxi-
mum result. The military position of Japan is bound to be 
strengthened not only on account of her acquisition of strate-
gically placed islands in the Pacific Ocean, but also on account 
of additions to her navy, army and merchant marine, which are 
constantly gaining in rapid proportion to these same things on 
the side of the United States. 
An army prevents war in the same way that a police force 
keeps order in a city and a fire department keeps down fires. 
A disturbance may become too great for a police force and be-
come a riot, but only because the police force has been slow to 
act, is deficient in numbers, or inefficient in the performance of 
its duty. A fire may get away from a fire department and be-
come a conflagration. The principal duty of a fire department 
is to extinguish the fire quickly before it becomes a conflagra-
tion. The ability to get there with whatever equipment is 
necessary at the proper time corresponds to a military mobili-
zation and concentration. 
The two great foreign policies of the United States which 
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will probably be brought to the test some day are the Monroe 
Doctrine and the "Open Door" in China. These simply are 
necessary policies for the existence of the United States itself. 
The American continents are the richest undeveloped accessible 
parts of the earth's surface. The white race has gone as far 
east as it can in Asia. The Americas are the meeting ground. 
There are about 800,000,000 people in Asia; there are about 
350,000,000 people in Europe; and 150,000,000 in both of the 
Americas. All people think they have a right to live and that 
their right is superior to the right of others. It is the same old 
story. The Panama Canal is the key point. The question 
whether a white or a yellow civilization shall predominate will 
be decided in America. If the nations inhabiting these conti-
nents are not prepared to· defend themselves against all comers, 
they may go the way all weak nations have gone before, and 
their countries pass into the hands of a stronger, more efficient 
people. 
It rests with the American people to determine what will be 
done under the circumstances. 
THE DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC 
By George Haven Putnam, Vice President of the New York 
Peace Society, and late Major of United States Voluntee·rs 
The events of the European war have brought home to 
American citizens the nooessity of giving thought to the defenses 
of the Republic. Inquiry is being made as to whether the re-
sources of the United States have been so utilized that the Na-
tion is now in a position to protect its own coasts; and whether, 
further, it is strong enough to take such action as may be re-
quired in connection with the obligations it has assumed outside 
of its immediate territory. If the defenses are at this time in-
adequate, it is necessary to decide what ought now to be done. 
The experts appointed for the purpose have reported through 
the Government to the country that under present conditions it 
would not be practicable to prevent a hostile force from taking 
possession of our coast cities. 
They report further that in case any European power should 
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undertake to occupy territory in South America or in Central 
America the United States would be impotent to prevent such 
occupation. 
It is evident that the Government of the United States is dere-
lict in its duty if it fails to take such measures as the experts re-
port to be necessary to protect its own territory and resources, 
to maintain its independence, and to fulfill its obligations. 
We have been told by the teachers of pacifism that if a nation 
will attend to its own business, will avoid acts of aggression, and 
will treat its neighbors in the family of nations with fairness 
and with good will, it will not itself be liable to attack. We have 
been reminded by these same pacifist teachers that the United 
States is protected from possible aggressors by not less than 
three thousand miles of ocean. We have been told further that 
our international relations have been so far established and con-
firmed by treaties that we can be in no risk of war unless we 
are foolish enough ourselves to be the aggressors. We have, how-
ever, learned that treaties and guarantees are no protection, 
and can, in fact, by ambitious and aggressive nations be treated 
as "scraps of paper" to be torn up at will. 
Belgium presents a sad example of the failure of neutrality 
guaranties to prevent aggression and ruin when such guaranties 
stand in the way of an ambition for empire. We may learn from 
the recent history of China that distance is itself no protection. 
In 1793 Washington wrote to Congress : 
·'If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; if 
~e desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments 
of our rising prosperity, it must be made known that we are at 
all times ready for war." 
Washington could hardly be described as a jingo. He had at 
heart nothing but the interests of his country, and he realized 
that these interests depended largely upon the maintenance of 
peace; and yet Washington, at a time when it took months to 
move sailing vessels across the Atlantic, found ground for anx-
iety about the defenses of our coast. 
Some years before the present war, a colonel of the Prussian 
staff, Freiherr von Edelsheim, brought into print in Berlin a 
small volume called "Operations on the Sea." In this volume 
the colonel presents, not as a dream or a romance based on mili-
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tary possibilities, but in the form of a well-considered scientific 
scheme, a report of plans for the invasion and domination of 
Great Britain and for taking possession of certain coast cities 
in the United States. 
It may, I think, be recognized that if Great Britain had at 
this time been carrying on war with Germany without the aid 
of her powerful allies, she would have been crushed, or would 
at least have come very near to destruction. The German colonel 
points out that as soon as coaling stations have been secured (by 
the appropriation of the British West Indies) on this side of 
the Atlantic the German fleet will be in a position to act against 
the United States. Writing four or five years before the present 
war, he shows that there were then available transports sufficient 
to ship two hundred and fifty thousand men a week for three 
weeks from the mouths of the Elbe, the Weser, and the Ems. 
He estimates, however, that the first two shipments would be 
sufficient for the purpose. He explains that there would be no 
idea of an assault in front of the fortifications o·f cities like 
New York and Boston. There is no difficulty, he points out 
(and in this he is, of course, right) with a selection of proper 
weather, in landing at Southampton (Long Island) the troops 
required for the occupation of New York. ''The Americans 
have no army, and there would be nothing to withstand the 
advance of two or three German divisions. A similar course 
would be taken with Boston and Washington. These cities 
would be given the alternative of being destroyed or of putting 
themselves under bonds for satisfactory indemnities or ran-
soms." A thousand millions of dollars might be sufficient, he 
suggests, in the case of New York. "With the coast cities and 
the capital occupied, the Republic would crrumble. • • • 
"We should have no need," the Colonel goes on, "to occupy 
the country as a whole; that would be a large task and would 
give no advantage. Our purpose would be accomplished when 
we had secured a dominating control over the policy of the 
United States.'' 
We may ourselves not accept the conclusion that the occupar 
ti on of the coast cities would bring about ''the crumbling of 
the Republic." Chicago and Denver and San Francisco would 
have something to say to that. A resistance would be organized 
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and the invaders would in the end be thrown out; but think of 
the destruction of life and of resources that would be brought 
about by such an occupation and by the final struggle for inde-
pendence! The development of the Republic would be put back 
for half a century or more! Are we willing to look forward 
to any such risk 1 Have we of this present generation the right 
to take any such chances? 
A recent article in the '' Kolnische Zeitung, '' written for the 
purpose of bringing the Americans into a proper state of min1l 
in regard to such occurences as the Lusitania horror, points 
out that the newly built German submarines have a radius of 
four thousand miles. "We are now in a position," said the 
writer, "when the proper time comes to dominate .American 
as well as English commerce.'' 
We may recall the disgrace that came upon the country when, 
in 1814, Washington was occupied and (to the disgracl' of the 
British commander) was burned. At the time when 6,000 Brit-
ish took possession of the city of Washington we had 200,000 
men under arms. These troops had been hastily collected, and 
had been brought togcth<'r by method and preparation that may 
fairly be described as ''hysterical.'' They were not organized 
forces. There was plenty of public spirit and of individual 
courage, but the men were not fit to fight together because they 
had not been trained tog<'ther and th<'y had had no previous 
relations with their commanders. 
It is the recommendation of the pacifists, headed by the late 
Secretary of State, that we should delay preparing to resist in-
vasion until there was immediate risk of war. What enemy, 
they inquire, is in sight? Why should we borrow trouble in 
advance 1 In replying to such a contention, one feels as if one 
were talking to children . When the enemy is in sight, it is 
already too late to make preparation. The million of men who 
would, as l\fr. Bryan reports, "spring from the streets of the 
city and from the f11rms to the defense of the Republic" would 
be no good when they had reported themselves to the colors. 
They would have no training, no arms, no officers. They would 
c>onstitute simply what the Germans call canonen-futter-food 
for powder. The pacifist teachers who are willing to send for-
ward a~ainst disriplinC'<l soldiers nnskillC'd and untrained citi-
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zens are ready to sacrifice to no purpose the public spirit and the 
patriotism of the Republic. 
Switzerland presents for us an example of what a patriotic 
and high-spirited nation is prepared to do for the purpose of 
maintaining its own independence and of fulfilling its neutrality 
obligations. Switzerland has had three hundred thousand 
trained citizens under arms for the defense of its frontier, and, 
however great may have been the temptation to Germany to 
press an army into southern France through Swiss territory, 
its three hundred thousand rifles in the hands of trained citi-
zens have constituted a sufficient barrier to German aggression. 
Holland had, in similar fashion, organized its resources for 
the defense alike of its sorely threatened independence and of 
its neutrality obligations. There is no necessity for the United 
States to accept a burden upon its resources in any way pro-
portioned to that which is borne so sturdily by these two little 
neutral States. 
If, however, we are prepared to maintain for our great Repub-
lic an assured defense and full independence of action, we must 
do something to arm and to train a proportion-a comparatively 
small p:roportion-of our citizens. 
We are told by the pacifists that no war is impending; that 
there is no nation which would find it to its interests to attack 
the United States, and that by the time this war is over the 
European Powers will have been so far weakened that no one 
of them will be able to remain aggressive. We may hope that 
this war will result in the final smashing of militarism and in 
the defeat of the attempt of the Hohenzollerns to establish an 
Imperial domination; but what wise-minded American is willing 
to permit the maintenance of American independence to depend 
solely upon the chance that England and its allies may suc-
ceed T Why should we leave a duty that belongs to ourselves 
to be performed for us by the men on the other side of the 
Atlantic who are fighting in the cause Clf civilization? 
National defense will cost money, but the cost ·will be small 
as compared with the enormous loss of res011rces that would be 
caused by a successful invasion, or even by a temporarily suc-
cessful invasion, of our country. The ''insurance'' required is 
but a trifle in proportion to the property to be protected, but 
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the property is the smallest part of the matter. There are such 
things as National liberties, National policies, National obliga-
tion to be maintained which are still more precious than the 
value of a building in New York, in Boston, or in Washington. 
We have had sermons from Mr. Bryan and others of his group 
as to the risk of corrupting the peaceful American character 30 
that our own nation would take on a spirit of militarism and 
would become a peril to itself and to its neighbors. It is diffi-
cult to listen with a straight face to diatribes of this kind. 
What intelligent American believes that there is any risk 
of this country being abused or dominated by a military spiiit T 
The one time in our history when the possibility of military 
domination occurred was at the close of the Civil War. Critics 
m Germany were pointing out that the returning armies then 
had in their hands the destinies of the Republic and that there 
was serious chance that these half million or more of men might 
decide to take control of affairs into their own hands. Ameri-
cans knew better. Their soldiers melted back into the ranks 
of citizens and returned to their peaceful vocations. 
Today, after half a century of peace and with the interests 0·f 
the country entirely absorbed in productive undertakings, what 
prospect is there that the people would be willing to create an 
army that would undertake to control the Republic, or that 
the material for such an army could be found 1 The little body 
of thirty odd thousand men which constitutes the present mobile 
force is hardly likely to ''dominate the Republic.'' A police 
force organized for the maintenance of peace within our terri-
tories and for our contribution to the maintenance of peace 
throughout the world cannot carry with it-certainly not if 
made up with American material-any spirit of militarism. 
Mr. Bryan and his group seemed to make no distinction be-
tween the fighting that is an aggression and the fighting that 
may be called for as an act of duty. If A and B have promised 
to protect the interests of a weaker brother, C, and if A finds B 
plundering C, and, in the dislike that always comes from oppres-
sion, abusing him as well as robbing him, has A no duty in the 
matter 1 Is it in order for A, while poor little C is being crushed 
out of existence, to fold his hands and say, "I believe in peace!" 
That was the relation that England and France bore to Bel-
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gium, whose independence and whose liberties they had promised 
to protect. That is the relation that the United States now 
bears to the states of South America and of Central America. 
\Ve must either prepare ourselves to fulfill this obligation or we 
must admit that we have accepted it without any intention of 
carrying it out.. How many Ame·rican citizens are ready to ac-
cept the humiliation of such an admission? 
The pacifist who talks blandly about "the risk of war being 
slight, '' and says that he is willing ''to take the chance,'' for-
gets that the chance is not his to take. The men of the present 
generation are not the owners of the United States. We hold 
simply in trust a heritage that has come to us from our fathers; 
and it is for us to hand down to our children unimpaired the 
dominions and the resources of the country. We hold also in 
trust the ideals of our Republic, its purposes, and its rightful 
influence in the adjustment of the problems of the world. It 
is for us now to take such wisely considered action as shall place 
us in a position to fulfill these trusts. We must be prepared to 
take our part in the settlement after this war, and to use the 
influence of the United States, which will come only if back of 
the influence there is evidence of organized powers, in behalf of 
the claims and the rights of oppressed peoples. We must see 
to it that in this settlement territories and peoples are no longer 
to be chucked over the table as if they were pawns or poker 
chips. It is for the United States to insist that in the con-
trovertial territories the people shall have a voice in the selection 
of their own government, and in the direction of the policy to 
be pursued by such a government. 
OUR NA VY IN THE EVENT OF WAR 
(From the Review of Reviews, February, 1916.) 
In his Manhattan Club speech in New York, last Nv·vember, 
President Wilson declared that never in our history was the 
navy stronger and better prepared than at the present moment, 
and that all we have to do is to increase the pace and carry 
on the policies that have been pursued in the past. Taking issue 
with this roseate view of our naval preparedness, Mr. George 
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von L. Meyer, who was Secretary of the Navy under President 
Taft, points out in the Yale Review what he regards as serious 
defects in the equipment and personnel of our present naval 
organization. 
In order that his readers may not infer that his judgment 
in these matters is a mere matter of individual opinion, Mr. 
Meyer reminds us that in the hearings before Congress less than 
a year ago, one of our officers testified that it would take five 
years to develop the organization of the navy department and 
the fleet to a high state of efficiency. Another officer high in 
authority, after calling attention to the remarkable wol'k of the 
German army's general staff, announced that Congress has thus 
far failed to provide a general staff in our navy. "W~ have no 
tested war plans, no tested organization for war, no tested mo-
bilization scheme; and, as to gunnery, our competitors have ac-
complished feats greater than any that we have ever attempted." 
Mr. Meyer lays special emphasis on the shortage of men,-
a condition that goes on from year to year without an;v serious 
attempt at remedy. It is well understood that, at the present 
time, a ship that has its full complement of men is a rare ex-
ception, and it is estimated that to provide the necessary crews 
for all the ships in the navy that would be useful in time of 
war would require twenty thousand additional men. Mean-
while, it is becoming more difficult, with the increased size of 
our ships, to provide them with sufficient crews when completed. 
The torpedo destroyers of the Atlantic fleet are twenty-five pei· 
eent short of their proper war complements. About a dozen de-
stroyers are in reserve with half complrmentR. About a rlozen 
more are to be placed in reserve immediately, and only about 
twenty will be left in active service. 
What could our navy do by way of protection of our coasts 
against a foreign invader? A report of a German general, pub-
lished before the war, !'lhowed the posRihility of Germany trans-
porting to the United States and landing four army corps, con-
voyed by its fleet. It would seem that such a force might with-
out difficulty secure a base extending twenty-four miles inland, 
anil with thp a.irl. of tbr. railroacl<1 to move men an<l sicg-e-inms, 
this force would be able to threaten New York City with de-
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etruction and compel the payment of billions of dollars to the 
German invaders. 
In Mr. Meyer's opinion, we can at the present time place no 
reliance on the submarine fleet to protect our coast. The Ger-
man submarines, sailing four days in order to reach the Irish 
coast. have been able to patrol for thirteen days before re-
turning to their base, requiring only ten days out of thirty 
for overhaul. Our best submarines, those of the K class, tra-
versing the same distance as the German submarine, could stay 
but one day on patrol duty and be able to get back to their base 
for a ten-day overhaul. 
Mr. Meyer's most serious criticisms of 011r naval administra-
tion are embodied in the following paragraphs from his article: 
Are we to continue the policies which have resulted in a sub-
marine flotilla that, according to the evidence of one of our most 
enlightened officers, had only a few submarines prepared for sea 
service when required for the maneuvers with the fleet last May 
and October, and only one flt and prepared for sea service this 
autumn? 
Are we to go on falling far behind the other countries in the 
development of aeroplanes and hydroplanes, which have played such 
an important part in locating the armies of the enemy, the move-
ments of ships, the position of hidden batteries, and have been in-
strumental in driving off the enemies' airships? The arming of 
airships has taken great strides, and yet we have no equipment in 
that direction worthy of mention. 
The great naval powers have seen the necessity of concentrating 
fleets in two or three stations, and that it is not advisable or ad-
vantageous to have a great naval base in a commercial harbor. 
Realizing this, England, at an expense of over $20,000,000, has 
established a great naval base at Rosyth. Five years ago, a naval 
board of experts recognized the importance and great value of 
Narragansett Bay as a naval base, with its vast anchorage, natural 
depth of water, and two entrances of easy defense. Captains of 
industry have appreciated that it is cheaper to dismantle plants 
which are unprofitable and to concentrate at advantageous locations. 
Finally, what he regards as the fundamental defect of the 
Nary Department is its lack of a competent military organiza-
tion, charged with the preparation of the fleets for war and 
with their conduct in war. As a consequence our navy is being 
built and administered on a peace basis, and not being efficiently 
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prepared for war service. Our leading naval officers have for 
years advocated the organization of a general staff, but Congress 
has always refused to grant it. It should be clearly understoo.J, 
says Mr. Meyer, that even though Congress were to appropriate 
for a navy as large and as well built as that of Great Britain, 
and to supply it with the necessary number of officers and men, 
it could not be used efficiently against a powerful enemy unless 
it had in time of peace been supplied with a directing brain, a 
general staff, to equip it for war, and train it in war duties. 
HAVE WE A NAVAL POLICY? 
A distinguished officer of our navy, Rear Admiral Bradley A. 
Fiske, writing in the North American Review, declares that 
every great naval power in the world except our own has worked 
out for itself a definite policy, having first decided what it ought 
to do and then how to do it. In the case of the United States, 
however, there has been no deliberate adoption of a definite 
naval policy. 
Ever since its beginning, in 1775, the United States has ex-
celled both in the material and the personnel of its navy. As 
Admiral Fiske points out, our ships have always been good, and 
in many cases have surpassed those of similar kind in other 
navies. He attributes this fact to the strong common-sense ·Jf 
the American people, their engineering skill, and their inventive 
genius. He reminds us that the first warship in the world to 
move under steam was the American ship Demologos, sometimes 
called the Fulton the First, constructed in 1813; the first electric 
torpedoes were American ; the first submarine to do effective 
work in war was American; the first turret ship, the Monitor, 
was American; the first warship to use a screw propeller was the 
Princeton. an Amcriran : and th<> Admirnl :111ds th<it the naval 
telescope sight was an American invention, although be modestly 
refrains from stating that he himself was the inventor. Admiral 
Fiske not only has a good opinion of the construction of Amer-
ican ships of today, but considers their equipment of the best, 
and regards the American battleship as the finest and mo3t 
powerful vessel of her class in the world. 
As to personnel, the American seaman has always excelled, 
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and so has the American gunner. No ships, says Admiral Fisk~, 
have ever been better handled than the American ships; no naval 
battles in history have been conducted with more skill and 
daring than those of American ships; no exploits in history sur-
pass those of Cushing, Hobson, and Decatur. 
In spite of the excellent account that our men and ships have 
given of themselves, it appears that in the handling of the navy 
as a whole we have never excelled; though, in Admiral Fiske's 
opinion, no better individual fleet leaders shine in the pages of 
all history than Farragut and Dewey. Instead of operating our 
material and personnel in accordance with carefully laid plans, 
the matter has been left largely to the inspiration of the com-
mander on the spot. Both material and personnel have suffered 
from lack of a naval policy, but operation has suffered incom-
parably more. Since the people do not comprehend the supreme 
importance of being ready when war breaks out to operate the 
material and personnel skilfully against an active enemy in ac-
cordance with well-prepared strategic plans, they fail to provide 
the necessary administrative machinery. 
Admiral Fiske attributes the success of the British navy in 
the present war not so much to the individual com·age an•l 
ability of the officers and men, or even to their skill in handling 
their ships in squadrons, as to the fact that a definite naval 
policy has been followed. In other words, "the British nation 
has had a perfectly clear realization of what it wants the navy 
to do, and the navy has had a perfectly clear realization of how 
!<> do it." 
If this country' should decide that the navy must be so pre-
pared that, say twenty years hence, it will be able to protect 
the country against any enemy, there would be for us the dis-
tinct advantage of ''having ahead of us a definite, difficult thing 
1o do, which will at once take us out of the region of gnesswol'k 
1md force us into logical methods. We shall realize the problem 
in its entirety; we shall realize that the deepest study of the 
wisest men must be devoted to it, as it is in all maritime 
countries except our own." 
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AN AMERICAN NAVY AT LAST 
(World's W01·k, Vol. 32, page 608) 
To appreciate properly just what the new Navy bill does for 
the United States, we should compare the American battle fleet . 
when these new ships are finished, with the fleets of the great 
European Powers at the beginning of the present war. Naval 
experts now estimate the fighting abilities of navies by capital 
ships-that is, by dreadnaughts and battle eruisers. Smaller 
battleships and cruisers may do effective work under certain 
circumstances; these older vessels, however, do not belong in the 
fir.>t line of battle. All other vessels such as scouts, destroyers, 
and submarines are intended chiefly as supporters of the great 
battle fleet. To measure our strength against other navies, there-
fore, we should take the capital ships as the unit of value. 
England entered the present war with 29 capital ships. Ger-
many began operations with 17, France had 4, and Japan 4. 
All these nations had many big vessels under construction-
England 17 and Germany 11, all of which have probably long 
since been finished. The figures for capital ships given above, 
however. are those published by onr own Navy Department on 
July 1, 1914. 
At present the United States has 17 capital ships, all of which 
are battleships built and building. The sixteen authorized by 
the new bill will give a battle fleet of 33 ships. If the Michigan 
and the South Carol1"na are included in the dreadnaught fleet--
and certain authorities do include them-our force l}f capital 
shinf'l will ht> in<.> reast>d to ~:> . 
l\feasured by the standard of two years ago, this means a 
pow<>rful nav_\'. Thi> new huildin~ nlan will giw us. when 
finished, a much great~r Navy than that with which En~lan; l 
entered the European war. 
It is stron1?er than Germany's ante-bellum fleet by eighteen 
ships, and immensely greater than the fleet of France and 
Japan and the other naval powers. This comparison, however, 
has certain limitations. We are placing our fleet, as it will he 
about 1922, with the fleets of our main rivals as they were in 
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July, 1914. Just what England, Germany, and Japan have 
been doing in the last two years we do not know. England 
eertainly has been building at an enormous rate since the war-
began. Her building facilities are on a huge scale and, accord-
to all reports, are constantly adding to the fleet. Despite large 
losses, the English navy is immensely stronger now than when 
the war began. Germany, also, has probably been building at 
a furious rate, and there are suspicions that Japan has been 
::iecretly adding to her dreadnaught fleet. On the othE:r hand, 
should the great naval battle between Germany and England 
ever be fought to a finish, the losses might reduce both navies 
to a point where ours would be as large, or even larger, than 
either. In all likelihood, however, the United States will have 
to adopt an immensely greater naval program than o-m present 
one if we are ever to equal or surpass England's. Perhaps 
the new bill will give us a larger fleet by 1922 than Germany'!!, 
and almost certainly it will place us far ahead of Japan and 
other naval Powers. 
But the really important thing is that the American people 
are showing signs of taking their navy seriously. The Army 
bill shows that public opinion has not develo·ped to the extent 
that demands an efficient military force. In time we shall prob-
ably learn the need of a general army; apparently we have not 
yet reached that stage of national advancement. Clearly, how-
ever, the American. people, 1tS a mass, do demand a Navy-
hence the present appropriation, the largest ever made by any 
nation in time of peace. This new spirit is worth far more, 
as a national asset, than the new ships and the new men. It 
is a spirit that will always watch jealously the Navy's interests, 
demand its adequate support, and not tolerate again a decadence 
such as had taken place in the last eight years. There is more 
in this new Navy bill than ships and ammunition. The bill 
gives us practically a general staff-a force of naval experts, 
directly under the civilian Secretary of the Navy, whose busi-
ness it will be to keep the Navy constantly prepared for war. 
It also provides an increase from 51,000 to 68,700 in men, with 
an increase, in case of emergency, to 87,000. We shall have a 
naval reserve, a flying corps, a selection of officers by fitness 
instead of senfority. All these are reforms for which the friends 
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of the Navy have been struggling for yea.rs. The fact that 
Congress has finally granted them, under pressure of a. powerful 
public opinion, sllows that we have seriously undertaken the 
business of organizing a. Navy worthy of the Nation. 
VILLA'S LESSON 
(World's Work, l'ol . 32, Xo. 1.) 
A week or two after the pursuit of Villa. began, the lessons 
of his raid on Columbus assumed far deeper significance than 
the mere bandit hunt of which we read from day to day in the 
newspapers. But whether or not Villa got away, whether some 
traitor betrayed him alive, or a. tempting reward delivered him 
up, dead, to American justice; whether the waste places of Du-
rango and Sinaloa swallowed him up, or like a burly will-o'-
the wisp, continuing to elude capture, he strung out more than a 
third of the United States Army in a baffled thin thread far 
down into Mexico-all this became of relatively small concern 
to us. The thing that did assume greater proportions in our 
eyes was the exposition of the state of our Army which Villa's 
raid made . 
.As the consequence of a border raid it became almost imme-
diately necessary to drain the entire continental United States 
of all its mobile military forces, with the exception of e:ix skele-
ton regiments not even recruited up to their peace basis. It 
also became immediately evident that if what had been planned 
as a. bandit hunt should result in anything more serious those 
six regiments would hardly form an additional drop in the mili-
tary bucket. The President would have to call on the country 
for volunteers and he would have to use untrained men imme-
diately. Out of eight aeroplanes representing the entire avail-
able Army equipment all but two were out of commission within 
a week. Villa loafed away with a week's start because he knew 
then what we know now, that along the entire Mexican frontier 
there was not in existence a single supply train which could 
have made immediate pursuit possible. These and other mat-
ters of unsparing detail Villa wrote on the international wall 
where we could eee them. 
Villa produced a bloody corroboration of the President's state-
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ment that he did not have enough men properly to patrol the 
border. There are certainly not enough regulars to patrol the 
border and to do any extended police work in Mexico, and in 
any other contingency which might arise we are almost certain 
to have to rely in large part on untrained or very meagerly 
trained troops. 
WHAT ABOUT AN ARMY7 
(Abstract of an article by Mr. Peter Clark McFarlane in 
"Colliers" for March 17, 1917.) 
Today a situation confronts us where the nation may have to 
lean heavily upon the army, and the army is unready. What is 
more astounding, nothing is being done to ge·t it ready-so far 
as immediate preparations are concerned. 
If we consider the army as a whole, the following situation 
is encountered. The mobile part of it-only 43,000 men in the 
United States-has been mobilized for practically five years; 
yet it is totally unequipped to face a modern enemy. It is 
underhorsed, undermanned, undergunned. The regiments are 
half strength. There is not a piece of modern heavy field ar-
tillery made or even designed. There is not a fighting aero-
plane. There is no equipment for a modern system of fire 
control, observation balloons, aerial radio apparatus and so 
forth. We have no modern bombs or trench mortars. We haJ 
to strip Panama to get wireless apparatus for the Mexican 
border. 
There are shortages of signaling apparatus. We lack reserves 
of rifles and light artillery, and adequate reserves of ammuni-
tion, of shoes, of clothing, and of other individual equipment. 
We could not equip an army of half a million men within a year. 
The European War has been going on for over two years 
and a half, but seems to have brought no lessons home to those 
who make the conditions under which our army must do its 
work. Pictures and details of the new and wonderful heavy 
guns in use upon the foreign fields have been published in the 
scientific magazines of America, but either it has occurred to 
no one in authority in the Government to have such a gun 
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made or such a carriage under construction, or else no one has 
been permitted to do it. This becomes doubly significant when 
it is realized that none of the new long-range field guns of middle 
size which have proved so destructive in Europe are being made 
in this country by our private ordnance builders. This Gov-
ernment will have to create its own if they are to be created. 
The British allotment of machine guns is 72 to each 2,000 
men, while our allotment is but 6; and that in the face of the 
dreadful experience abroad which is perfectly well known to 
us all. The Government has not even decided what type of 
heavy machine gun it will use, let alone beginning to manu-
facture it. 
Not only have we inadequate reserves of rifles for regulars 
and militia, but there is today not a rifle for the volunteers. 
Of field artillery there is not enough to equip the regular army 
and militia at war strength. The heaviest of this artillery is 
but 4.7 and 6-inch, and there is very little of that. So equipped, 
an army of ours could not stand for a day before one sup-
ported by the huge field guns and the giant howitzers employed 
by the first-class military powers. To illustrate: Supp-0se Japan 
should land within thirty days upon the Pacific Coast an ex-
peditionary force equal to our entire mobile army at the present 
time, 43,000 men-a thing she could readily do. Judging by 
our experience with the National Guard, we could swiftly oppose 
her with, all told, 150,000 men; yet our army would be in-
effective because of weakness in artillery. Meantime the expedi-
tionary force would be constantly reinforced, and our troops 
could do nothing but retire, leaving the invaders to subjugate 
the country at their leisure while we waited the year or year 
and a half necessary to design and manufacture the heavy ar-
tillery required to enable our troops to engage the enemy suc-
eessfnlly. 
SELECTED ARGUMENTS AGAINST INCREASED MILI-
TARY PREPAREDNESS 
AMERICA'S BID FOR SEA POWER 
BY ARCHIBALD HURD 
At a moment when seven of the great maratime nations of 
the world are gripped in the toils of war, the eighth, the United 
States, is embarking on ambitious schemes of naval expansion. 
America already possesses a war fleet, which includes 32 battle-
ships-12 of them Dreadnaughts-besides 14 armored cruisera, 
15 protected cruisers (obsolescent), 3 small scouts, over 60 de-
stroyers, more than half as many submarines, and 30 gunboats; 
7 more Dreadnaughts (each of about 30,000 tons displacement 
and costing, in the aggregate, about $21,000,000), 17 torpedo 
boat destroyers, 3 fleet submarines, 35 submarines and 6 aux-
iliary vessels are under construction. It is now proposed to 
adopt a five-year building program-1917-21-which is esti-
mated to require an expenditure of $100,000,000. So far as 
merchant shipping is concerned, the United States owns nearly 
6,000,000 tons, including ships on the Great Lakes; according 
to the latest returns of the Bureau of Navigation of the Depart-
ment of Commerce 360 more merchant ships of 1,067,856 groRS 
tons are being built. The United States, it is apparent, is 
making a strong bid for sea power, in which ships of commerce 
as well as ships of war are included. 
Europe's embarrassment is regarded as America's opportu-
nity. That statement, cynical in its implication, reflects only 
half the truth. The course of the war has revealed the value 
of ships of war, both for offense and defense, just as it hns 
exihibited the weakness of the Uni tel States' mercantile marine 
and the dependence of this great people on foreign tonnage. 
In consequence of the horrors enacted in Europe, the main issue 
at the approaching Presidential election will not be preparedness 
for the conquests of peace, but preparedness for the rigors of 
war. In official quart.ers the possibility of America becoming 
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involved in war in the future is admitted. Hostilities in the 
Pacific are looked upon by responsible politicians and others as 
possible. Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, the President of 
the War College and a member of the General Naval Board 
over which Admiral Dewey presides, in giving evidence recently 
before a Congressional Committee even went so far as to state 
that h& ''was not sure we are not going to fight England'' and 
urged that the United States should have the largest navy in 
the world. There is also a determined movement for strength-
ening the American mercantile marine. Some form of compul-
sory military service is advocated, and it is also urged that a 
Territorial Army should be provided. But the main issue is 
maritime, because the United States is pre-eminently a maritime 
country. 
The popular movement in favor of the rapid expansion of the 
war fleet has already produced its effect on President Wilson's 
administration. The Democrats came into power pledged to 
naval economy, and now that the Party has again to face the 
electors while the world-war is in progress, the Government is 
not only devoting attention to the strengthening of the mercan-
tile marine by exclusive legislation, but has submitted to Con-
gress the most ambitious program of warship construction ever 
conceived on the other side of the Atlantic. The scheme em-
braces an expenditure in the next five years-1917 to 1921-
of just over $100,000,000 on naval construction-that is, apart 
from naval maintenance, repairs, pay, etc., of the existing fleet--
and even that amount will not be sufficient to complete the last 
of the ships which Congress is asked to vote. The following 
are details of this ambitious program: 
1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 Total 
Dreadnoughts ....... . .. 2 2 2 2 2 10 
Battle cruisers ..... . .. . 2 1 2 1 I) 
Scout cruisers . . ........ 3 1 2 2 2 10 
Destroyers .. .. .. .. ..... 15 10 5 10 10 50 
Fleet submarines .... ... 5 4 2 2 2 15 
Coast submarines ....... 25 15 15 15 15 85 
Gunboats . .... . ..... . .. 2 l 1 4 
Hospital ships ..... ... . 1 1 
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Ammunition ships 
Fuel oil ships . . ... ... . . 
Repair ships .......... . 
1917 1918 1919 1920 
1 
1 1 
1921 Total 
1 2 
2 
1 1 
Provision is also made for a large expenditure on aviation and 
on the provision of a reserve of ammunition, $5,000,000 being set 
aside for the latter purpose. 
It is calculated by the General Board that if this program 
is carried out the United States navy will be composed of the 
following vessels, built or building, in 1921: 
Battleships, first line .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . . } 27 
Battle cruisers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 58 capital ships 
Battleships, second line 
(Pre-Dreadnoughts) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
Armored cruisers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
Soout cruisers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
Cruisers, first class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . } 5 
Cruisers, second class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 • 
Cruisers, third class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
Destroyers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 
Fleet submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
Coast submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 
Monitors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
Gunboats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
Supply ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
Fuel ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
Transports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
Tenders to torpedo vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
Special types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
Ammunition ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
It is estimated that each battleship will involve an expenditure 
of about $3,750,000, each battle cruiser $3,500,000, and each 
scout cruiser $1,000,000. The most expensive battleship in the 
British Fleet, of which official figures are available, is the 
*These ships are already obsolescent, and under modern condit10111, 
owing to their low speed, have small value. 
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Iron Duke, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe's flagship, of 25,000 tons 
placement, which cost just over $2,000,000, and the British bat-
tle cruise~ on which most money was spent is the Queen Mary, 
the outlay being about $2,100,000. In other words, the pro-
posed type of American battleship involves'the investment of a 
sum 87 .5 per cent higher and the corresponding American bat-
tle cruiser an amount of 66.6 per cent higher than we, in our 
days of greatest extravagance, have devoted to ships of these 
classes. And yet it bas been argued that the day o.f the big 
armored ship is over. The highest professional authorities of 
the United States Navy are not of that opinion, but propose a 
greater expenditure on a smaller number of capital ships than 
has ever before been suggested. 
In his report to Congress the Secretary of the Navy has put 
forward a justification of the new program, the most noteworthy 
feature of which is the appearance of the battle cruiser, on 
which, prior to the war in Europe, officers of the United States 
Navy looked with little favor, though they had been built for 
the British Fleet for nine years before hostilities opened. ''The 
lessons of the European War,'' the Secretary states, ''warns 
us that it is better to spend money in time of peace for prepara-
tion than to run the risk, however remote, of sorely wanting 
ships and munitions if suddenly needed." 
Turning from this condemnation of the submarine, which, 
could they read it, would make German civilians open tl1eir eyes 
in wonder and incredulity, the General Board proceed to an 
explanation of the needs of the United States Navy in respect 
of other types of ships. For twelve years past not a single 
cruiser-large or small-has been built, with the result that 
the American fleet is the blindest of all the naval forces of the 
world; as the Navy Secretary has admitted, it has only three 
scout cruisers, besides a group of obsolescent and slow armored 
and protected cruisers. A new policy in this resrcr.t is recom-
mended and ernbOdied, thoug-h somewhat half-heartedly, in the 
five-year program. The General Board has explained its views. 
The United ~tatei:: Navy hns hitherto been somewhat ill-bal-
&nced as to the different types of ships represented in it, as 
battleships need auxiliaries of every sort, both combatant an'd 
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administrative, for their support in battle and in being. These 
auxiliaries have not been authorized in proper proportion. 
With its two extensive coast-lines, the United States o·ffers 
great opportunities to an enemy to descend by surprise upon its 
P.hores. To meet such attack the tendency of the country is to 
place too much reliance upon localized defenses, such as forti-
fications, mines, and submarines. These are essential, but these 
alone cannot accomplish the desired purpose. 1.'he aim should 
be too meet the enemy at a distance and defeat him before he 
reaches the neighborhood of the coasts. For this pmpose the 
country must rely upon the sea-going fleet. To forestall the 
attack of the enemy our main fighting force must be concen-
trated at a strategic center, ready to move and defeat the hos-
tile main body before it has enkrcd :-in area where its presence 
is seriously dangerous to this country's interests. When con-
centrated, the main fleet can expect to move in time to forestall 
the enemy's intentions only if it has an adequate information 
service to provide early and continuous intelligence of the 
enemy's movements. An efficient s~outing force composed of 
battle cruisers and scouts must be thrown far beyond the main 
body to assure this indispensable service of information, which 
cannot otherwise be secured. In default of information, the 
main fleet can ~mly act blindly. 
In the general development of our naval strength, the time 
has now come to provide for battle cruisers and scouts. The 
main duty of both types is to get information. For this purpose 
numbers are necessary, and to provide these numbers without 
undue cost we have recourse to the scout type, wherein the size 
is as small as will afford adequate speed and radius for the ac-
complishment of the work. A scout in pursuance of her duties 
should rather avoid than seek battle. Yet she must seek and 
maintain contact with the enemy, and, therefore, cannot dis. 
pense with a small armament for her protection when unavoid-
abl~r forced into an engagement by ships which she cannot evade. 
So much for the naval proposals whwh have been submitted 
to Congress. To what extent they are merely political window-
dressing, it is impossible to state. At any rate, if they are un-
popular with some sections of the Democratic party, they are 
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regarded by many Republicans as erring on the side of modera-
tion. 
In the meantime the task of expanding the American mer-
chant navy is being pressed forward with energy in all the 
shipbuilding yards of the United States. The American mer-
chant fleet has never recovered from the injury which it re-
ceived during the Civil War. Prior to that event, as Mr. John 
D. Long has recorded, "two-thirds of the foreign trade of the 
United States was carried in ships flying the Stars and Stripes. 
Our shipping represented 5,250,000 tons which was valued at 
$275,000,000 (about £55,000,000). The extraordinary character 
of the emergency demanded that much of this tonnage should 
be impressed into the naval and military services. One million 
eight hundred thousand tons were taken, and one hundred mil-
lion dollars withdrawn from the capital embarked in the ship-
ping industry. The Alabanw, the Confederate tiger of the sea, 
destroyed one hundred thousand tons of shipping and caused 
the owners of vessels to seek foreign registries or tie their craft 
to the dock rather than send them, unprotected, on voyages which 
were likely to end in the prize court or destruction by fire at sea. 
Foreign ships and foreign capital eagerly entered the industry 
which the United States was compelled to abandon. From the 
damage inflicted upon our merchant marine during the Civil 
War there has been, as yet, no full recovery; and the stupendous 
increase in our foreign trade is the more remarkable in view 
of the fact that it has been effected in spite of the disadvantage 
of its conveyance in ships flying the flags of other nations than 
our own." 
Admiral Flctrher afterwards turned to the consideration of 
the condition of the ma,teriel of the Fleet. While he admitted 
that, in general. the materiel condition of the battleship squad-
rons was "very goo<l hoth in hnll an<l machinery," he pointed 
out that, with the possible exception of the Kansas, the six mod-
ern battlf'ships of th<' Connrcticnt clRss were unreliable at fleet 
speed owing to thf'ir <lefpctive shafting. Turning to the cruiser 
sqnadron-too small for its work-he admitted that its condi. 
tion was not satisfact'()ry. and the same verdict, more strongly 
worded, was passed on the submarine flotilla. "While there· 
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are twelve submarines in full commission assigned to operate 
with the :fleet, only six of these vessels were in condition to 
proceed to Pensacola for the winter's work. All twelve were 
assembled in M1ay in New York, but only ten were available for 
the war problem, May 18th-25th. Of these ten a number were 
soon incapacitated by machinery troubles, and at times not more 
than five submarines were ready for duty. Due to untrained 
crews some of the five were not ready to undertake submergea 
work.'' His testimony with reference to destroyers was not more 
consolatory. "There are at present attached to the fleet eleven 
destroyers with one-half complements, a makeshift brought about 
by the shortage of personnel. As a result of this shortage the 
training of those destroyers is not complete, and the limiting 
conditions brought about by the restricted activities of one-half 
complements lead to false conclusions and requirements.'' 
Finally, he directed attention to the absence of heavily-armored 
fast vessels and light cruisers, commented on the absence of 
suitable mine-sweeping vessels, and reported that ''there are no 
anti-aircraft guns supplied to vessels of the fleet." At the same 
time the Admiral contended that a marked improvement had 
been effected in target practice. 
Whatever course the war in Europe may take, the adoption 
of these proposals would render the United States Fleet second 
only in strength, so far as paper calculations go, to the British 
Fleet. It is the opinion of American naval officers, however, 
that hostilities will not close without a battle action on a grand 
sea.le, necessarily resulting in the foss of many British anJ 
German ships. In that event, it is evidently assumed that the 
American Fleet may find itself not inferior even to the British 
Fleet. Whether, on the other hand, naval opinion on the other 
side of the Atlantic will succeed in prevailing upon Congress to 
reform the Navy Department so as to give professional opinion 
greater weight, and thus raise the war efficiency of the Fleet, and 
to create a General Staff is open to serious doubt. American 
politicians, irrespective of party, have always insisted on undis-
puted political control of the services, and n()thing has yet oc-
curred to suggest that this attitude will change. 
Whatever action Congress may take with reference to the 
Military Preparedness 57 
proposals fo-r adding to the strength of the American Fleet, the 
putting forward of a shipbuilding scheme involving the expendi-
ture of $100,000,000 by the Democratic Party, pledged to re-
trenchment on armaments, at the time of the last Presidential 
election, is a development which merits attention on this side of 
the Atlantic. That ambitious scheme has already received the 
full approval of President Wilson, who· is a pacifist statesman. 
Hlis administration has apparently not been unconscious of the 
apparent inconsistency exposed by an examination of the prin-
ciples Qf his party in contrast with the costly naval program 
aubmitted to Congress. Mr. Daniels has been constituted the 
apo-kesman of the party. After referring to his previous endorse-
ments of the proposed "naval holiday," the last in his 1914 
report, he remarks: 
"The hope I then entertained for an international under-
atanding to end competition in costly building programs I still 
cherish. While conditions today are such that no suggestion 
looking to an international agreement could probably be made 
with prospect of certain success, I entertain the sincere desire 
that when peace is restored the suggestions made in my report 
may be considered and approved by the great navy-building 
nations of the world.'' 
This, we have been told by British pacifists, is to be the last 
of all wars; it is to arrest naval competition th'l'oughout the 
wo-rld. The Democratic administration of the United States, in 
spite of Mr. Daniels' words, does not seriously entertain that 
anticipation. America already possesses a navy larger than the 
navies either of Franoo, Italy, Russia, Austria-Hungary, or 
Japan, and comparable, bearing in mind strategical and other 
eonsiderations, to the German Fleet. Nevertheless, while the 
Great War, which may perchance lead to a great reduction of 
naval strength in European waters, is still in progress, the 
United States Congress is being urged to adopt the most costly 
and ambitious naval program ever submitted to it or any other 
democratic legislative body. 
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OUR DRIFT INTO MILITARISM 
SIGNIFICANT FACTS FOR THINKING PEOPLE 
By Oswald Garrison Villard 
In his telegram of acceptance, Mr. Hughes said flatly that 
he did not believe that this county was in any danger of mili-
tarism. I have been wondering ever since whether his absorp-
tion in the duties of the Supreme Court has not, perhaps, led 
him to overlook certain very plain manifestations of the militar-
istic spirit in this country. He is aware, of course, that the 
Naval bill, just passing with its stupendous appropriations of 
fifty years ago, and that it is the largest single proposal for 
ships of war ever passed at one time by any Christian nation, 
containing a more menacing naval programme even than the 
German expansion of 1901, which had so much to do w·ith the 
coming on of the present terrible conflict. Mr. Hughes ought 
to be not unaware than in Japan this tremendous naval expan-
sion of ours is considered a direct menace to the safety of Japan, 
upon which issue its ministry has been violently attacked, and 
urged largely to increase its navy. He ought to know that even 
before the outbreak of the war the menace of the Amerrnan fleet 
was cited in the Reichstag, the House o.f Commons, in Japan's 
Parliament, and in France as a reason for increasing the naval 
appropriations of those countries. 
If it be objected that militarism is a state of mind, then what 
shall we say to the actions of our best-known Rear Admiral, 
who goes up and down the country publicly declaring that 
the army and navy of the United States shall carry the Ameri-
can flag to Cape Horn 1 Is not this militarism 1 In no other 
nation would this be tolerated. And yet he is unrebuked, and 
so is Gene.ral Wood, who in deliberate defiance of the order of 
Secretary Garrison, in January, 1915, forbidding the very thing, 
has made several hundred speeches in regard to our prepared-
ness, visiting every boys' school of note to hold up the military 
ide·al as the highest good for Americans. This same officer was 
one of ~hose who induced the Postmaster General to exclude 
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from the mail an alleged Socialistic criticism of the army. The 
German General Staff would have done no less, and would but 
have accomplished the same. Is it without significance that in 
Cleveland men have been sent to jail for ten and thirty days, 
respectively, merely for criticising the National Guard; that in 
Iowa a small boy was sentenced to jail for nine years for re-
fusing to salute the flag in school 1 Then there has been a wide-
spread demand for the dismissal of the able and competent 
Assistant Secretary of Labor because he thinks soldiers a feudal 
anachronism. A public meeting has been broken up by soldiers 
in uniform in Brooklyn because a speaker dared to criticise 
the immorality of the army, which a Republican Secretary of 
War, Mr. Stimson, has denounced as worse than any other army 
in the world, as attested by the statistics of foul diseases. What 
clearer instances than these, which are not exceptional, could be 
given of a new American but old Prussian attitude toward the 
army-that it is sacrosanct. 
There is no more dangerous lobby at Washington than the 
army and navy, for it is on the job all the time, and it speaks 
with official and a wholly undeserved professional authority. 
Behind it are all the officers of the army and navy. Fifteen 
hundred new ones are to be appointed this year, and many 
more in the next few years, all of them centres of military agi-
tation and infection-all of them openly working for the ag-
grandizement of their caste, just as the entire National Guard 
constituted a united lobby for the defeat of the Continental 
Army and the enhancement of their own service. Never in the 
history before this have we built up a military machine in this 
country comprising men remaining at home and exercising their 
political power to further their own profits. These men are now 
being paid-for the first time. There are to be four hundred 
thousand of them ; does the history of our Grand Army agitation 
for rensions suggest anything in this connection, or not 1 Is 
th Bir pay likely to be increased soon or not 1 Here in New York 
State there has been enacted by trickery a bit of militarism 
unheard of even in Germany. I refer to the conscription of all 
boys of well-to-do parents-note the democracy of the law-and 
tha statute giving the Governor of New York powe·r to draft 
into active military service in peace times any citizens of the 
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State. As the President of the United States, since July 1, has 
1he power to turn every militiaman into a regular by a stroke 
of his pen, a citizen of New York may suddenly find himself a 
private soldier in the regular army for six years, whether he 
wills it or not, whether he has conscientious scruples against 
bearing arms or not, and this may happen in time of peace aa 
well a<' in :i,ne of war. 
This strikes deliberately at one of the most sacred American 
liberties, the right of freedom of thought, of action, and of con-
science, since it excepts not even Quakers, as England excepts 
them today. Yet militarism has no foothold among us ! Finally, 
we have the widespread demand for universal military service, 
echoed by certain newspapers and politicians, although it is 
universal military service which led to the Prussianizing of all 
Germany in forty years. Never was there a less militarily in-
clined people than the Bavarians. In my lifetime they have 
been Prussianized. Yet we actually believe that we can take the 
same road without the same results; that human nature is dif-
ferent in America than elsewhere. The introduction of uni-
versal military service even on the lines of Switzerland and 
Australia, about which we know very little, except that it has 
bred much dissatisfaction in Australia and that the Swiss system 
is wholly inapplicable to a continent, would create so vast a ma-
chinery of administration as to subordinate every other depart-
ment of the Government in numbers and appropriations. Ger-
many has had 800,000 men under arms under her universal serv-
ice; we should have fully 1,500,000. In its every manifestation, 
moreover, the movement is undemocratic, and, therefore, un-
American. Nothing is more absurd than the statement that a 
universal army is a democratic one. The prime military teach-
ing is that the soldier shall subordinate will, thought, con-
science to his superior. 
It is all putting the emphasis on the wrong thing-this exact-
ing of force and brute power above the things of the spirit. 
It is distracting attention from the great democratic experi-
ment as it is robbing every forward movement in America of 
means to carry it on. It is a destructive policy instead of the 
constructive policy of facing squarely toward a world federa-
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tion, or at least the freeing of the world from the fear of one 
nation by another, this militarism for defence only, which is 
the most successful device yet invented by tyrants for keeping 
their peoples despotically enslaved. As President Madison 
phrased it, large armies and heavy taxes are the best possible 
means of putting in the hands of a few complete power over 
the many. Mr. Hughes will not, of course, have been deceived 
by the preparedness parades, into many of which city em-
ployees and those of large corporations were dragooned. He 
can surely not have been deceived by the plea that this is for 
preparedness at the close of this war, for he knows that the 
ships just authorized will not be ready for eight or ten years, 
nor the new armies for five. We are arming not against a vic-
torious Japan and German in 1916 or 1917, but are arming to 
be a menace to the world five years from now when the Euro-
pean war will be fading into the background. 
Mr. Hughes is too keen not to know that the outcry for more 
soldiers comes not from the masses of the people, but particu-
larly from the very classes that have heretofore battened upon 
spooial privilege. It is but a new phase of the old battle of 
democracy against privilege, in which many of us took part 
joyfully under his leadership as Governor of New York. Be-
fore he considers further statements on this l! tiestion of pre-
paredness he ought to study carefully the forces behind it, the 
reasons why the enormous sums we have expended have been 
so wantonly wasted, whe-n, as Secretary Stimson says, they 
have been quite large enough to have prepared us effectively 
for defense, whether t:qe entrusting of enormous sums to the 
same agents will mean less waste and more effi.tiiency, the effect 
that this armament will have upon the terrible conditions in the 
Old World, and above all, whether we are not creating right 
here in our America a political-military machine which will 
yet subordinate the civilian to itself and become as in Germany 
insidiously, unsuspectedly, little by little, a menace to social 
development, to our own liberties, and to the peace of the world. 
62 Bulletin of the University of Texas 
A PLEA FOR PACIFISM. 
"Will America Yield to the Armament MadnessY" By 
Washington Gladden. 
(From The Nation, August 3, 1916.) 
The policy of preparedness may be advocated by honest men, 
but it has a way of working out its own results. Armaments 
mean war, and sooner or later they bring war. Of course, they 
are for self-defence. All the belligerents on the continent of 
Europe are :fighting on the defensive. Ask them! Now that is 
the logic of preparedness. No matter what you intend by it, 
that is what it means; you never can make it mean anything 
else. The kindling of suspicions and fears always will go 
hand in hand with the work of building the armament. 
One fact we may as well face. If we are going to have war 
indefinitely, it will not be the same kind of war,it will wax worse 
and worse continually. Eixperience makes that plain. This war 
is immeasureably worse, more :fierce, more relentless, more in-
human than any war in history. And the next war, for which 
we are urged to get ourselves in a state of preparedness, will be 
so much more diabolical than this, as this is more devilish than 
any which has preceded it. Thousands of minds, furnished with 
all the resources of Kultur, will be constantly at work invent-
ing new machinery for mangling men ; new methods of inflicting 
torture; new appliances for erasing the beauty of the earth 
and ruining its fairest monuments, for making its loveliest 
lands uninhabitable. 
You know that this principle of preparedness ruled, not very 
long ago, in all our private life, and especially in the highest 
ranks. Every gentlemtn went armed. You might or might 
not have a shirt, but you must have a sword. Now in those 
old days of preparedness homicide was as common as eggs for 
breakfast. The time came when it seemel to many men that 
they had some better thing to do than to keep themselves al-
ways in a state of preparedness for war. They began to say, 
"What mortal reason have we for hating and fighting our 
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neighbors T It is monstrous. It is ridiculous. It is not eco-
nomical." What did they do about it? Why, they outlawed 
it. They said, ''The thing for us to get rid of is this whole 
business of preparedness. We will have no more of it. The 
man who goes about with pistols and rapiers in his belt is not 
a hero, he is a ruffian, he is an undesirable citizen. He keeps 
the air full of explosive material. Let him remove himself 
out of our sight. We can get along without him very well." 
What happened then Y Why, homicide and violence practi-
cally came to an end; at any rate they were greatly abated. 
Peace returned to earth. Security began to reign. What was 
the cause of this change Y Was it trust in the police? Not at 
all. It was trust in one another. It was the replacing of the 
ape and tiger psychology of human relation by the human 
psychology of good-will. Instead of seeing in every unknown 
man an enemy or an assassin, they began to assume that every 
unknown man was a neighbor and a friend. Where that trust in 
one another exists, you have peace and security; where it is 
absent, though your streets are full of policemen and there is 
a jail on every square, you will always be in fear and in peril. 
We all know which way we want history to go, and we can 
help it to go that way if we are strongly going that way our-
selves. But we shall not help it to go that way if we ourselves 
are going the other way; if we are building ships, enlisting sol-
diers, increasing armaments. 
Of course, we are going to build these ships and enlist these 
armies that we are now talking about for purely defensive pur-
poses. For defence against whom? I doubt whether any na-
tion on the face of the earth entertains toward us any purposes 
of aggression. Such purposes may be excited in some nation 
by the increase of our armaments, for no such construction ever 
goes on without guiding the thought of the people toward some 
suspected foe, and that is a secret which cannot be kept; the 
suspicion and the fear will stir resentment and hostility some-
where. But every nation on the earth which might be such a 
foe knows today that we are not now and cannot be for twenty 
years in any danger from her. All these nations, broken, wast-
ed, battered, and torn as they will be when they come out of 
this war, will know that we have no reason to be afraid of ag-
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gression from them. You know how easy it is to awaken na-
tional jealousies. Would it be strange if some of them should 
conclude that our defensive policy is a mask for some sinister 
design? If, as I strongly believe, no nation will be in condi-
tion to attack us within twenty years, then the ships which we 
build now will be junk before we have ever used them. It is 
safe to wait until the congress of the nations following this war. 
If it concludes to perpetuate militarism and preparedness and 
forces us to face the return of Hades, then we will have time, 
i:f we think it needful to get ready for that emergency. But 
if, on the other hand, it concludes to free the world from the 
scourge of war, we shall not only have some big and needless 
bills to pay, but shall be very much ashamed of ourselves. 
Was not that a pathetic note that was sounded across the 
sea a few days ago from one of the wisest and sane.st of the 
English statesmen, not now in office, Lord Roseberry? 
''I know nothing more disheartening than the announce-
ment recently made that the Uniter States, the one great coun-
try in the world free from the hideous bloody burden of war, 
is about to embark upon the building of a huge armada destined 
to be equal or second to our own. It means that thlP burden 
will continue upon the other nations and be increased in pro-
portion of the fleet of the United States. I confess that it is 
a disheartening prospect that the Unitel States, so remote from 
the European conflict, should voluntarily in these days take up 
the burden which, after the war, will be found to have broken, 
or almost broken, our backs.'' 
It is not from England alone that this warning comes. Per-
haps the most trenchant and influential pen in Berlin is that 
of Maxmillian Harden. And what says Maxmillian Harden 
todayt 
''I find that the time has come when this terrible catastro-
phe must make similar catastrophes impossible. • • • .All 
great Powers must get together in order to make an end to this 
unparalleled crime. • • • The nations now at war will 
have to live together in this house which they are now destroy-
ing, and the more terrible the destruction the worse for all of 
us. • • • If this war is not to be the last great war, it is 
nothing else than criminal madness.'' 
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If old Europe is struggling to get out of this Gehenna of mili-
tarism, what idiocy it is for Young America to be getting ready 
to plunge into it! If the failure of other nations to make this 
war the last great war will be criminal madness, what kind of 
madness is it for this nation to spe·nd a billion of dollars in pre-
paring to continue and perpetuate war? 
It is within the power of this nation, at this juncture, to in-
flict upon the human race an unspeakable injury, and it looks 
as though she were bound to do it. God grant that I may not 
live to see it! 
SHOULDER ARMS! 
(Independent, October, 1915.) 
Henry A. Wise Wood is alarmed. As President of the Amer-
ican Society of Aeronautical Engineers he attended the other 
day one of the "war" luncheons, being held every week at 
the Technology Club of this city, and there made a few remarks. 
According to the papers, Mr. Wood is said to have said: 
"Records in Washington show that a certain European nation 
could land in the United States within forty-eight days 750,000 men, 
with 250,000 horses and munitions sufficient for a three months' 
campaign, with half the transports available before the present 
war. • • • Furthermore similar records show that a nation 
on the Pacific could land 350,000 troops on the Pacific Coast within 
sixty-one days with half its transports." 
Tho it may show a culpable disregard for our national safety, 
we must def er for the present consideration of the ''certain 
European nation.'' Whichever it may be, it has sufficient 
troubles of its own at this moment and we can assume it will not 
attack us during the next few weeks, certainly not before Con-
gress meets and increases taxes three or four fold so as to re-
lieve our "criminal unpreparadeness." 
But how about that "nation on the Pacific"? Can it possibly 
be Japan 1 If so, we should worry. 
Just think how easy it would be for the little yellow men to 
seize the Pacific Coast, proceed up over the mountain passes 
of the Sierras and Rockies and thence overrun the corn belt of 
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the l\fiddle West. Indeed, once in the Mississippi Valley, there 
would be no stopping them until the pie belt of New England 
and the fried chicken belt of "our beloved Southland 'J were 
completely occupied. 
In the first place the astute Japanese statesmen, having re-
versed their historic policy of maintaining friendly relations 
with the United States, would have to consider how 60,000,000 
people could invade territory occupied by 100,000,000 people, 
5000 miles away. Having resolved that this was easy enough, 
they would then proceed to mobilize their present army of 
250,000 and increase it sufficiently so that 350,000 troops could 
be spared to cross the seas. Of course, they would have to in-
crease the army much more than 350,000 in order to have at 
home enough to protect the Empire in case the United States 
sailed around the back way and attacked them in the rear. 
But before the Japanese armada could attack America, the 
United States Navy would have to be sunk, for as Napoleon 
proved long ago, no overseas invasion can take place as long 
as the enemies' fleet is afloat. But as no fleet can operate 4000 
miles from its base at more than fifty per cent of its strength, if 
Admiral Vreeland of our navy is to be believed, Japan, whose 
navy is now much inferior to ours, could hardly concentrate 
a fleet a third the strength of the American on the Pacific 
Coast. 
But we know the Japanese are wonderful fighters, so we 
will assume that they have sunk our entire fleet. Then all they 
would have to do would be to clear the seas of our submarines 
and mines. The fact that England, with the greatest navy in 
the world, has not yet dared attempt to land an expedition on 
the German or Belgian coast, or Germany upon the English 
coast, is no proof that the abler yellow-skinned men would not 
succeed. 
It will now be perfectly safe for the armada to set sail and 
be at our shores in the sixty-one days specified. The fact that 
some of these days have been consumed in waiting for the 
American fleet to be destroyed need give no concern. We know 
there are some four fast liners that go from Yokohoma to San 
Francisco in three weeks. No doubt the 1000 slower, smaller 
transports that would be needed could be readily put in com-
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m1ss10n and convoyed over without mishap within the "sixty-
one days.'' All the armada would then have to do would be to 
disembark its troops, demolish the fortified coast defenses and 
take the several lines of trenches that had been thrown up from 
Lower California to Puget Sound. 
We all know how easily the coast defenses can be taken-at 
the Dardanelles, for instance-and how easily trenches have 
been captured in the present war, as the men on the firing line 
universally attest. No doubt the Japanese would seize our en-
trenchments with but few casualties. And to make certainty 
doubly certain, they would unquestionably bring with them 
sufficie·nt 42 centimeter guns and ammunition, so that they 
would not be caught napping as the Russians have been. De-
spite the poverty of Japan and the enormous taxes owing to the 
Russo-Japanese War, she would find no difficulty in sending 
over enough ammunition so as to use up a million dollars' 
worth a day, as is frequently done before a charge by the Ger-
mans. 
Having then, with their considerably smaller navy, sunk our 
fleet, eluded our submarines and mines, and with their army 
taken our trenches and driven our regular army and militia 
back over the Rockies, the Japanese would not find it very 
difficult to dispose of our "contemptible little army" of 1,000,-
000 volunteers, that would have been drilling night and day in 
the meantime. 
And thus, in the shake of a lamb's tail, the subjugation of 
the United States would be complete. Mr. Henry A. Wise 
Wood deserves the thanks of the republic for his warning. 
To arms, Americans, to arms ! 
IS IT NECESSARY Y 
(From the Independent, October, 1915.) 
The plans worked out by Secretary Garrison and Secretary 
Daniels for increasing the army and navy were given out at 
Washington last week. They are said to have the President's 
approval. 
The Garrison plan calls for an increase of our regular army 
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from 93,000 to 140,000, and the establishment of a continental 
army of soldiers who will enlist for six years. During the first 
three years they will be required to serve two months each year. 
During the last three years they will be subject to call to the 
colors at any time. 
Secretary Daniels proposes a naval program for five years. 
The first year there will be begun two dreadnoughts, two battle 
cruisers, twenty-five coast submarines, five sea-going subma-
rines, twelve destroyers, etc., and there will be an increase <lf 
8000 men in the navy and an addition of 2500 to the Naval 
Academy. The program will increase the army appropria-
tions by $75,000,000 a year and the navy appropriations about 
the same. The entire program for nation11.l defense will total 
$400,000,000 for next year. 
This raises two questions that the American people have 
got to face, and face squarely. How are they going to raise 
the money? What are they going to get for it? 
First. The National Government is proposing a budget of 
a billion and a quarter dollars. 
Excluding postal appropriations, which the Government ul-
timately gets back in charge for service, Congress must provide 
about $900,000,000 next ye-ar. Over $600,000,000 of this will 
be for army, navy, pensions and interest on the public debt, 
all war items. This is more than twice as much as was ex-
pended on the German army and navy the year before the war. 
Thus the total expenditure for war will be more than two. 
thirds of all the disbursements of our Government. This means 
that the American people have got to go deep down in their 
pockets. And what for? 
To be sure, methods of warfare have changed, but defense 
as a political philosophy or a practicl precaution of states-
manship remains about the same as ever. Defense is only the 
last link in a long chain of reasoning. As has been said. "be-
fore defense comes attack, and before attack come all the mo-
tives for aggression, all the misunderstandings and racial preju-
dices, all the intrigue and secret diplomacy and military pre-
parations. '' 
The war has no doubt rendered a change in military methods 
necessary, and undoubtedly a strengthening of our forces. But 
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why should the American people go beyond this and overload 
themselves with taxation for defense, when Europe is bleeding 
to death and Asia is straining every nerve to keep on good 
terms with us, and whe·n war is certain to be the most hated 
word in existence when peace is once deelared. 
The United States never was so safe from invasion as it is 
today. Even tho the proposed increase is not unbearable it 
will necessarily tend to promote a feeling which will involve 
year by year greater expenditures until finally we fall under 
the same burden as the European nations. 
We are at the parting of the ways. Let us give this matter 
the most sober consideration before it is too late. 
ARE WE PREPARED? 
(Independent, November 6, 1916.) 
''We have not a moment to lose. 
condition of being fatted capons. 
anything it is worth saving." 
We must get out of this 
If this country is worth 
Thus spake H. M. Byllesly a few days ago at a luncheon in 
Chicago, where $30,000 was subscribed to start a National Or-
ganization to induce Congress to pass legislation making mili-
tary training and military service universal among the youth 
of the land. 
Apparently, then, we are in for a campaign to make every 
male citizen in the United States a soldier. What should be 
the attitude of sensible people on this question? 
In the first place, universal service in time of peace is so 
revolutionary a departure for this country that it can only be 
urged as a dire and all-compelling military necessity. Is 
there any such necessity ? Let us see. Congress has just au-
thorized a defense budget of $67,344,000, the greatest sum ever 
appropriated in time of peace by any nation on earth for mili-
tary purposes. The naval program laid down will give us in 
three years 157 additional ships. Altho our navy was already 
third in rank among the nations of the world, our fleet is to be 
increased by ten battleships, six battle cruisers, ten scout cruis-
ers, fifty torpedo boat destroyers, sixty-eight submarines, one 
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hospital ship, three fuel oil ships, two ammunition ships, two 
gunboats, two destroyer tenders, one fleet submarine tender, 
one transport and one repair ship. We are to have 87,000 
sailors to man these ships. This means that our naval pro-
gram, which cost $150,000,000 in 1913, the year before the 
Great War, will this coming year cost us $588,000,000. 
The army program is not one whit less impressive. The in-
fantry is to be increased from thirty-one to sixty-one regi-
ments, the field artillery from six to :fifteen, the cavalry from 
fifteen to twenty-five and the coast artillery from 170 com-
panies to 363. The standing army is to be increased from 
102,000 to 220,000. Every soldier is to enlist for seven years, 
three years of active service, four years of reserve service. In 
ten years there will be 2,000,000 men training e·very summer. 
The National Guard has been increased and become practically 
a part of the regular army. It is calculated it will comprise 
about 440,000 men. The army program which in 1913 cost 
only $100,000,000 has expanded to $267,000,000. 
When it is remembered that the navy is our first line of de-
fense and that, according to Admiral Vreeland, no navy to-
day can operate at more than fifty per cent of its strength over 
3,000 miles from its base of supplies, it would seem as tho we 
ought to be equal in fighting strength to any possible oppo-
nent in our own waters. 
But, since Admiral Dewey has said that our navy is already 
as good as any on earth and General Miles has said that our 
army could drive any foreign foe into the sea that landed here 
before they could go back and ge-t reinforcements and President 
Wilson has said, "this country is not threatened from any 
quarter," we may conclude that our present military forces 
are large enough at least to "hold the fort" until our great 
citizen volunteer army can be recruited, equipt, drilled and pre-
pared for action. 
The experience of England in the present war demonstrates 
that a volunteer citizen army recruited after the war has be-
gun is as good as any possible conscript army, no matter how 
long and highly trained, if only a little time is given to get 
going. The army and navy of the United States as provided 
under the recent legislation would seem to be able to give the 
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American citizen that time whenever the country needs his 
services. Why take him out. of civil life tilJ then 1 
MORAL PREPAREDNESS 
(From The Independent, January 10, 1916.) 
We have already discussed at length the President's pre-
paredness progmm from the military and financial stand-
point. Is there not an aspect of the problem, however, more 
fundamental than either 1 
Here we are in the midst of the direst calamity known to 
history. Europe is bleeding to death. Asia is straining every 
never to hold our friendship. We would seem to be safer 
from invasion than at any time during our history. We 
are not only safe, but we are prosperous. Our prosperity, 
however, is not the result of our own planning. It is coined 
out of Europe's agony. And yet at the very time when our 
hearts should open as never before to the piteous cries from 
across the water, when all our thoughts and all our substance 
should be freely given to binding up the broken wounds, when 
the hour calls for a supreme and glorious unselfishness, we are 
proposing to retire within our little world and prociaim as our 
national policy, ''safety first.'' 
Instead of considering how to embark on a course that would 
bring us the gratitude and love of every nation-such for in-
stance as taxing ourselves to lend them a billion dollars to re-
pair their losses after the war-we propose a plan that will in-
evitably make each one of them hate us a little more. 
Some years ago we returned to China $10,000,000, which 
was an overpayment on the Boxer indemnity. That was not 
a present to China, but only a refusal to keep what did not 
rightfully belong to us. Yet the return of that sum-half the 
cost of a modern dreadnought- has made the United States the 
most beloved nation on earth in the hearts of that great Asiatic 
people now so sincerely groping for light and liberty. Is there 
not a lesson here for a nation that would plan preparedness 
for peace T 
Let us then make haste slowly in increBBing our armaments. 
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Bv the time the war is over we shall most likely find the na-
ti~ns ready to organize the world for peace and some sort of 
disarmament. If that is the case, any great burden of taxa-
tion now imposed on the American people for armament pur-
poses will be wasted. 
If the nations, however, instead of making a durable peace. 
only declare a truce in order to continue the mad scramble 
for greater and ever greater armaments, then the United States, 
having lost neither in treasure nor in men, will be in a better 
position than any other nation to enter the inevitable and 
crushing race whose end is death to all but the most powerful. 
THE NATION'S PREPAREDNESS 
By Hon. Claude Kitchin (House Leader) 
(Part of statement given to Press of North Ca~olina, Novem-
beF 20, 1915.) 
The heretofore large and growing expenditures for our Navy 
has aroused the people <>f the country into asking, "Where shall 
it end?'' Secretary Daniels, in his report to the last session 
of Congress, December, 1914, said: "The naval appropriations 
in our own country have doubled in a dozen years and have 
gone up by leaps and bounds in other countries. If this mad 
rivalry in constructi<>n goes on the burden will become too 
heavy for any nation to bear." In his report of December, 
1913, he says: ''The growing cost of dreadnaughts, of powder 
and of everything that makes an efficient navy gives reason to 
pause. The heavy expense commands national and interna-
tional consideration. Ten years ago our largest battleships 
cost $5,288,000. The next dreadnaught will cost $14,044,000." 
(The dreadnaughts hereafter to be authorized will cost from 
$18,000,000 to $20,000,000, and in an interview the Secretary 
says all ship materials and munitions of war have gone up over 
30 per cent.) He asks, "When is this accelerating expendi-
ture to be reduced? • • • If it is not .hastened by appeals 
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for the peaceful settlement of national differences, the day is 
not far distant when the growing burdens of taxation for ex-
cessive war and naval expenditures will call a halt." 
Now, in the face of the deplorable truth recited by the Sec-
retary; in the face of the fact that we have a Navy superior 
to that of Germany or any other nation, except that of Great 
Britain; in the face of the fact that our navy is growing larger, 
stronger and better equipped than ever before; in the face of 
the fact, as the President declared both in his message to Con-
gress December last and in his recent Manhattan Club speech, 
"We are threatened from no quarter,'' the proposed "Prepared-
ness" program at one bound-one year-increases our already 
immensely large naval appropriations more than our total in-
crease for the last fourteen years; more than the increase by 
Germany the whole fifteen years preceding the European war, 
and more than the combined increase of all the nations in the 
world in any one year in their history (in times of peace). 
The five-year programme increases our naval appropriation 
over forty times more than the increase by Germany in five 
years preceding the European war; and $200,000,000 more than 
the combined increase of all the nations in the world for the 
five years preceding the European war; and over $50,000,000 
more than the combined increase of all the nations in the world 
for the whole period of ten years immediately preceding the 
European war ! 
Add to this the fact that prior to the beginning of the Euro-
pean war we were expending annually on our navy from 
$20,000,000 to $30,000,000 more than Germany or any other 
nation (except Great Britain) was expending on its navy. 
For the ten years preceding the European war we had ex-
pended on our Navy over $300,000,000 more than Ger-many or 
any other nation (except Great Britain) had expendt:d on its 
navy! And yet the metropolitan press, the magazine writers, 
the "Patriotic Societies" and the jingoes and war traffickers 
would frighten the country into the belief that we have a littlt>, 
puny, eggshell of a navy! 
The five-year naval programme calls for an increase of 
$500,000,000--$100,000,000 increase a year-which, including 
the inevitable incidental expenses for expanding the whole naval 
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establishment in order to accommodate the programme, will 
reach $600,000,000 or over by the time the five years expire I 
This is all extra in addition to the large appropriations we havo 
been annually making. 
The army four-year programme demands $450,000,000 in-
crease, over $100,000,000 a year extra, being an increase of 
more than 100 per cent over our annual army aI,>propriations ! 
All extra appropriations, be it remembered. Extra taxes must 
be paid by the people, be it remembered! 
Before leaving the subject of enormity of the proposed pro-
gramme. I desire to make a further observation: 
At the expiration of the five-year period for the programme 
this country will then be expending on its Navy and Army 
more than any nation in the world in times of peace ever ex-
pended on its army and navy; more than England, with her 
navalism, more than Russia or Germany, with their huge mil-
itarism. At the beginning of the European war Germany was 
expending for past wars and preparations for wars (on its army 
and navy) 55 per cent. of the total amount of revenues col-
lected, Japan 45 per cent., Great Britain 37 per cent., France 
35 per cent., the United States over 60 per cent. With the 
proposed military and naval programme enacted into law the 
United States will be expending over 70 per cent of its total 
revenues-that is, out of every $100 collected from the people 
over $70 will go into militarism and navalism, including pen-
sions, leaving less than $30 for all other functions of our gov-
ernment and for all other benefits of the people. 
THE BIG, OVERREACHING OBJECTION TO THE PRORGAM 
' . 
The -huge burden, heretofore unheard of or undreamed of, 
which this fabulous increase of appropriations for the army and 
navy will place upon the taxpayers can and will have to be 
borne, in spite of their murmurs and protests, which will surely 
come in the future. This of itself to me is a cruel wrong, 
especially under the conditions and situation of . our country 
and our navy, as I have above · outlined. · 
But the big, overreaching objection to · this stu'pendous pro-
gramme is that this sudden, radical and revolutionary move fol" 
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big water preparation on our part is going to shock the civilized 
world, and whatever be the outcome of the present war, will 
alarm the world again into an armed camp. It will postpone 
for generations the day of universal peace for which all Chisten-
dom has been praying. It will deprive this gov(;rnment, 
through its President, of the greatest opportunity to serve man-
kind that ever came to nation or to man, in the final negotiation 
of peace terms among the belligerents, to lay the basis of per-
petual international peace. 
The militarists and war trltffickers of every nation in the 
world will point to our conduct as an example and a cause why 
big war preparations and big armaments should be renewed on 
a larger scale than ever before, and its consummation will only 
be limited by the ability of the nations appealed to. If we take 
this step every nation will suspect-in fact, every nation will 
feel convinced, and no argument of our government can dis-
sipate such conviction-that our country in this tremendous 
step has other designs than mere self-defense. Every nation 
will absolutely know that no such step or measure is necessary. 
The world will be convinced, in spite of our protestations that 
we are preparing, as the Seven Seas Magazine, the crgan of 
the Navy League, advocated in its last issue (November) for 
wars of conquest. This organ of this so-called patriotic society 
in its same issue bodly broadcasts throughout our country the 
savage, barbarous sentiment which I quote: "There should be 
no doubt that even with all possible moral refinements it is the 
absolute right of a nation to live to its fullest intensity, to 
expand, to found colonies, to get ric.her and richer by any proper 
means. such as armed conquest. Such expansion as an aim is an 
inalienable right and in the case of the United States it is a 
particular duty." This organ of the Navy League, the organi-
zation, as I said before, which has, by organized effort, created 
the sentiment of our people for a big militarism and navalism, 
is but giving the people of this country and of the world an 
earnest of what we are to expect when this programme is en-
acted into law. 
The world, even among the belligerents of the present war, 
is already looking with grave suspicion and alarm upon this 
colossal step. Since writing the above, in confirmation of it, thr~ 
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morning papers bring to us the speech of Lord Roseberry, made 
at the London University on the night of November the 16th, 
from which I quote: "I know nothing more disheartening than 
the announcement recently made that the United States-the 
one great country left in the world free from the hideous, bloody 
burden of war-is about to embark upon the building of a huge 
armada. It means that the burden will continue upon the other 
nations, and be increased exactly in proportion to the fleet of 
the United States. I confess that it is a disheartening prospect 
that the United States, so remote from European conflict, should 
voluntarily in these days take up the burden, which, after this 
war, will be found to have broken, or almost broken our backs." 
THE WAR IN EUROPE AND ITS LESSONS FOR US 
By William Jennings Bryan 
Do not allow yourselves to be deceived or misled as to the real 
issue. The question is not whether this nation would defend 
itself if attaeked. We have a potential power of defense such 
as no other nation has today-such as no other nation has ever 
had, and other nations know it. There is no danger that an 
attack would not be resisted, and we would not depend upon the 
jingoes. They would be too busy making army contracts and 
loaning money at high rates of interest to reach the front. If 
we ever have a war, we will depend, as in the past, upon those 
who work when the country needs workers and fight only when 
the country needs fighters. 
T:b.e question, I repeat, is not whether we would be willing 
or able to defend ourselves if attacked. The real question is 
whether we shall adopt the European standard of honor and 
build our hope of safety upon preparation which cannot be 
made without substituting for the peaceful spirit of our people 
the spirit of the militarist and the swagger of the bully. The 
spirit that leads nations to put their faith in physical force 
is the spirit that leads people into war. It is the spirit that ex-
presses itself in threats and revels in the ultimatum. 
I ask you next to remember that it is an expensive thing to 
prepare for wars that ought never to come. It cost us $15,000,000 
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to build the last battleship launched, and that was only one-
tenth of the amount spent on the navy that year. You might 
think, from the manner in which the jingoes belittle our army 
and navy, that we are at present spending nothing on pre-
paredness. But we are, as a matter of fact, spending naw 
$250,000,000 annually, getting ready for war. We are spending 
more than $147,000,000 on the navy and over $100,000,000 on 
the army; and how much are we· spending on agriculture? The 
Department of Agriculture, which looks after the interests of 
the largest single group in this, the largest agricultural country 
in the world-the Department of Agriculture which plants ex· 
perimental stations throughout our land and sends revresenta-
tives throughout the world to gather information for the farm-
er's benefit-this Department receives an appropriation of 
$23,000,000 a year. We are in other words, spending more than 
ten times as much getting ready for war as we are spending 
on the Department of Agriculture. And yet the jingoes are 
not satisfied. They say that we must now turn over a new leaf; 
that we must get ready in earnest. 
If the jingoes insist that we are in danger of attack, let us 
propose that we get ready by building roads; it will greatly 
increase our defensive power if we are able to quickly mobilize 
our army and rapidly transport it to the point threatened. 
And there is an advantage about this kind of preparedness; 
if, after we have prepared ourselves, the war does not come, we 
shall be able to make good use of the preparation in the work of 
production. If, however, we divert the money from useful chan-
nels and spend it all on battleships and arms and ammunition, 
we shall have wasted our money if the w.ar does not come; and 
if it does come, the chances are that before it comes changes in 
methods of warfare will very much reduce the value of the 
preparation in which we have invested. 
But as some may be more interested in having the volume of 
loanable money increased than in having good roads I present 
another calculation. The total capital and surplus of all the 
banks of the United States-national, State and privatr-aggre-
gate a little less than four billions of dollars; with five billions 
we could duplicate every ·bank, double the loanable bank capital 
and surplus of the nation and have a billion dollars left with 
which to celebrate prosperity. 
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The taxpayers of the country will not be willing to bear the 
burdens necessary for the proposed preparation unless they are 
convinced that some nation is about to attack us. The jingoes 
understand this and they are, therefore, bearing false witness 
against other nations. They tell us to beware of Japan on the 
west, and if that does not frighten us they pick out some nation 
in Europe and accuse it of having designs against us; and if that 
does not frighten us they say: "Beware of the fate of Bel-
gium ! " How any normal mind can think of Belgium and the 
United States at the same time passes understanding. Belgium 
has seven millions and a half of people, while we have a hundred 
millions. Would not an ordinary mind, working smoothly and 
without excitement, be able to see the difference between seven 
and a half and a hundred T And there is a still greater dif-
ference. Belgium is separated from the countries roundabout 
by an imaginary boundary line, while we have the Pacific Ocean 
on one side and the Atlantic Ocean on the other. If any one is 
able to see the difference between an imaginary line and an 
ocean, let him learn what difficulty the nations have had in 
moving armies across narrow channels and then he will under-
stand the protection of the Atlantic Ocean. 
The third reason which I ask you to consider is this. The 
preparedness which we are now asked to make is against nations 
which are not preparing to fight us. But suppose we get ready 
to fight them ; will they not prepare against us T If they can 
scare us when they are not prepared, will we not scare them 
when we do prepare T And then will not their preparation com-
pel us to prepare more, and will we not scare them again and 
they us again, and we them again, until bankruptcy overtakes 
us all T This is no new thing. The people who profit by fur-
nishing preparedness have been playing the nations of Europe 
against each other for a generation. Every battleship that is 
built in one country is made the excuse for building more battle-
ships in oth~r countries. Let me illustrate the plan of the 
battleship builder. Suppose three farmers lived around a little 
lake and a battleship builder wanted to increase his business-
how would he go about it T He would go to the first farmer 
and say: "You are helpless. If your two neighbors were ta 
combine against you, they could overcome you; your lack of pre-
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paredness is an invitation to them. Let me build you a battle-
ship and anchor it here by your land. Then they will see· that 
you are prepared, and they will be afraid of you and peace will 
be preserved. ' ' He would then go to the second farmer and 
say : ''Do you see that battleship over there ? Do you know 
what that is for? That is for you. Are you willing to invite 
attack by being defenseless? Let me build you two battleships 
and then he will see that you are prepared and will be afraid 
of you and peace will be preserved. '' He would then go to the 
third farmer and say: ''Either one of your neighbors is more 
than a match for you alone; together they can annihilate you. 
Your only safety lies in the building of three battleships. Then 
when they see you are ready they will be afraid of you and the 
peace of the lake will be preserved." By this time he would 
be able to go back to the first man and say: "Your little bat-
tleship is out of date. It is a provocation instead of a pro-
tection. Unless you are willing to build more ships you had 
better sink that one. It shows that you want to fight and every-
body knows you can not fight. You must have four battleships 
on the latest pattern in order to prevent war by being prepared 
for it.'' And so on and so on. This is what they have been 
doing in Europe. Is it possible that they can entice us into 
this mad rivalry 1 
Some nation must lift the world out of the black night of 
war into the light of that day when an enduring peace can be 
built on love and brotherhood, and I crave that honor for this 
nation. More glorious than any page of history that has yet 
been written will be the page that records our claim to the 
promise made to the peacemakers. 
This is the day for which the ages have been waiting. For 
nineteen hundred years the gospel of the Prince of Peace has 
been making its majestic march around the world, and during 
these centuries the philosophy of the Sermon on the Mount 
has become more and more the rule of daily life. It only re-
mains to lift that code of morals from the level of the individual 
and make it real in the law of nations, and ours is the nation 
best prepared to set the example. We are less hampered by 
precedent than other nations and therefore more free to act. 
I appreciate the value of precedent-what higher tribute can I 
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pa~- it than to say that it is as uniYcrsal as the Jaw of crravi-
tation and as necessary to stability~ And yet the law of grav-
itation controls only inanimate nature-everything that lives 
is in constant combat with the law of gravitation. The tiniest 
insect that creeps upon the ground wins a victory over it every 
time it moves; even the slender blade of '"'Tas sings a sono· of 
triumph over this universal law as it lifts itself up toward the 
sun. So every step in human pro0 Tcss breaks the law of pre-
cedent. Precedent lives in the past-it relics on memory, be-
cause a thing never was, precedent declares that it can never be. 
Progress walks by faith and dares to try the things that ought 
to be. 
This, too. in the leading Christian nation. W c give more 
money every year to carry the gospel to those who live under 
othe·r flags than any other nation now living or that has lived. 
The two reasons combine to fix the eyes of the world upon us as 
the one nation which is at liberty to lead the way from the 
blood-stained methods of the past out into the larger and better 
day. 
We must not disappoint the hopes \Yhich our ideals and 
achievements have excited. If I know the heart of the American 
people they are not willing that this supreme opportunity shall 
pass by unimproved. No, the metropolitan press is not the voice 
of the nation; you can no more measure the sentiment of the 
pcacc-lovino· masses by the froth of the jingo press than you can 
measure the ocean's depth by the foam upon its waves. 
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